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Choice of law is a mess—or so it is said.  According to conventional wisdom,
choice-of-law doctrine does not significantly influence judges’ choice-of-law deci-
sions.  Instead, these decisions are primarily motivated by biases in favor of
domestic over foreign law, domestic over foreign litigants, and plaintiffs over defen-
dants.  They are also highly unpredictable.
This Article argues that these “mess” claims do not accurately describe at least one
domain of choice of law—international choice of law—and it demonstrates what is
at stake in this debate for global governance.  Part I provides a brief overview of
choice-of-law doctrine in the United States.  Part II documents the mess claims.
Part III then shows how the mess claims, if correct, would be bad news for global
governance.  Choice-of-law doctrine can increase or decrease global economic wel-
fare, enhance or undermine transnational rule of law, and facilitate or hinder trans-
national bargaining.  The extent of these effects, and whether they are beneficial or
harmful, depends largely on the degree to which choice-of-law doctrine actually
influences judges’ international choice-of-law decisions and the extent to which
those decisions are biased and unpredictable.  The mess claims thus imply that if
choice of law has any systematic effects on global governance they are likely to be
harmful.
Part IV uses statistical analysis of an original dataset of published international
choice-of-law decisions by U.S. district courts in tort cases to present evidence that
choice-of-law doctrine indeed influences these decisions; that these decisions are not
biased in favor of domestic law, domestic litigants, or plaintiffs; and that they are
actually quite predictable.  The mess claims, it turns out, may be myths—at least in
transnational tort cases.
Part V explores the broader implications of my analysis.  In particular, it explains
why these findings are encouraging from a global-governance perspective and why
they might plausibly extend to unpublished international choice-of-law decisions
and domestic choice-of-law decisions.  Overall, the Article’s findings suggest that
the conventional wisdom exaggerates what is wrong with choice of law and implic-
itly underestimates its contributions to global governance.
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INTRODUCTION
Choice of law is a mess—or so it is said.1  According to conven-
tional wisdom, choice-of-law doctrine does not significantly influence
judges’ choice-of-law decisions.2  These decisions are instead moti-
vated by strong biases favoring domestic over foreign law,3 domestic
over foreign litigants, and plaintiffs over defendants.4  Furthermore,
choice-of-law decisions are commonly thought to be highly
unpredictable.5
This Article argues that these “mess” claims do not accurately
describe at least one domain of choice of law—international choice of
law—and it demonstrates what is at stake in this debate for global
governance.6  Part I provides a brief overview of choice-of-law doc-
trine in the United States.  Part II documents the mess claims.
1 See, e.g., Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth of Choice of Law:  Rethinking Conflicts, 97
MICH. L. REV. 2448, 2449 (1999) (“Choice of law is a mess.  That much has become a
truism.”); Hillel Y. Levin, What Do We Really Know About the American Choice-of-Law
Revolution?, 60 STAN. L. REV. 247, 248 (2007) (reviewing SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, THE
AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION:  PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE (2006))
(“[M]odern conflicts theory and doctrine is a mess . . . .”).
2 See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, The Marginal Relevance of Choice of Law Theory, 142 U.
PA. L. REV. 949, 951 (1994) (noting popular belief that “choice of law theory exerts at best
a marginal influence on choice of law decisions”); Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law
in the American Courts in 1994:  A View “From the Trenches,” 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 2
(1995) (“[O]f all the factors that may affect the outcome of a conflicts case, the factor that
is the most inconsequential is the choice-of-law methodology followed by the court.”)
(emphasis omitted).
3 See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, Real Conflicts, 69 B.U. L. REV. 1, 59 (1989) (“In
practice, it is quite clear that what courts ordinarily do in conflicts cases is to apply forum
law.”); Ralph U. Whitten, U.S. Conflict-of-Laws Doctrine and Forum Shopping, Interna-
tional and Domestic (Revisited), 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 559, 560 (2002) (“Both the empirical
evidence and the existing scholarly consensus . . . indicate that there is a strong tendency
under all modern conflicts systems to apply forum law.”).
4 See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78
MICH. L. REV. 392, 398 (1980) (describing modern choice-of-law approaches as “pro-
resident, pro-forum-law, and pro-recovery”).
5 See Shirley A. Wiegand, Fifty Conflict of Laws “Restatements”:  Merging Judicial
Discretion and Legislative Endorsement, 65 LA. L. REV. 1, 4 (2004) (“[I]t has become diffi-
cult to predict what a court will do when faced with choice of law issues, and each case
seems to demand an ad hoc determination.”); see also Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of
Equal and Territorial States:  The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM.
L. REV. 249, 319 (1992) (“No set of choice-of-law rules has yet achieved a high degree of
predictability in hard cases . . . .”).
6 Global governance consists of “the processes and institutions . . . that guide and
restrain” transnational activity.  Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye Jr., Governance in a
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Part III argues that the mess claims, if correct, would be bad news
for global governance.  According to law-and-economics theories of
international choice of law, well-designed choice-of-law rules can
increase global economic welfare by creating incentives for private
parties to act efficiently and for governments to adopt efficient sub-
stantive laws.  If the mess claims are correct, however, they present a
serious challenge to these theories—after all, if choice-of-law rules do
not significantly affect judges’ choice-of-law decisions, then these rules
are unlikely to have important consequences for global welfare.7
Transnational rule of law requires that judges make decisions impar-
tially and that transnational actors generally comply with applicable
law.  Choice-of-law doctrine can bolster transnational rule of law by
providing rules for impartial international choice-of-law decision-
making and by helping transnational actors determine which laws will
govern their activity.  Likewise, it can facilitate bargaining among
transnational actors by clarifying mutual expectations about which
state’s law a court will apply in the event of litigation.  If the mess
claims are correct, however, then choice-of-law doctrine instead leads
to unpredictable choice-of-law decisionmaking by the courts, which
undermines mutual expectations and hinders transnational bargaining.
In summary, the mess claims imply that if choice of law has any sys-
tematic effects on global governance they are likely to be harmful.
Having established the mess claims’ significance for global gov-
ernance, Part IV then evaluates whether these claims accurately
describe international choice of law.  Part IV.A begins by examining
prior empirical studies of choice-of-law decisionmaking; taken
together, these studies provide significant, if mixed, support for the
mess claims.  However, there are reasons to suspect that these studies
underestimate the influence of choice-of-law doctrine on judges’ deci-
sions and overestimate the extent of bias in those decisions.  More-
over, these prior studies address choice of law generally, rather than
Globalizing World, in POWER AND GOVERNANCE IN A PARTIALLY GLOBALIZED WORLD
193, 202 (Robert O. Keohane ed., 2002).  For purposes of this Article, “transnational
activity” means activity having connections to more than one nation-state.  I use the terms
“international” and “transnational” purposefully.  The former refers to relations between
nation-states; the adjective “international” most accurately describes choice-of-law deci-
sions that choose between the law of one nation-state and another.  The latter refers more
broadly to relations among states and/or non-state actors that cross nation-state borders.
Thus, the adjective “transnational” describes the type of litigation in which international
choice-of-law decisions most frequently arise:  litigation concerning activity with connec-
tions to more than one nation-state, rather than purely domestic activity. See Joseph S.
Nye, Jr. & Robert O. Keohane, Transnational Relations and World Politics:  An Introduc-
tion, 25 INT’L ORG. 329, 330–32 (1971) (distinguishing “transnational” and “international”
relations).
7 See infra Part III.A.
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international choice of law specifically.  This limits the light they can
shed on the global governance implications of judges’ choice-of-law
decisions.8
In response to the limitations of these prior studies, Parts IV.B
and C develop and implement an alternative empirical strategy.
Using statistical analysis of an original dataset of published interna-
tional choice-of-law decisions by U.S. district court judges in tort
cases, I present evidence that (1) choice-of-law doctrine indeed influ-
ences these decisions; (2) these decisions are not biased in favor of
domestic law, domestic litigants, or plaintiffs; and (3) the decisions are
actually quite predictable.9  This Article’s empirical approach has sev-
eral distinctive features.10  Unlike prior studies, it attempts to measure
more accurately the effects of doctrine on judges’ choice-of-law deci-
sions by separating out what the different choice-of-law methods have
in common and by controlling for the legal merits of litigants’ argu-
ments.  This is only the second empirical study of choice of law to use
multivariate statistical analysis to account for other factors likely to
influence judges’ choice-of-law decisionmaking.11  More importantly,
it is the first study to focus specifically on the international choice-of-
law decisions of U.S. district courts, allowing it to shed empirical light
on choice of law’s implications for global governance.
Part V explores the broader implications of these findings and
shows why the Article’s results are good news for global governance.
Part V also argues that these findings might plausibly extend to
unpublished international choice-of-law decisions and domestic
choice-of-law decisions.12  As it turns out, the mess claims appear to
be myths with regard to published transnational tort cases, and they
may not accurately describe choice-of-law decisionmaking in other
contexts either.
No statistical analysis can “prove” or “disprove” the mess claims,
and ultimately messiness is in the eye of the beholder.  But the evi-
dence presented in this Article at least suggests that conventional
wisdom exaggerates what is wrong with choice of law and underesti-
mates its positive contributions to global governance.
8 See infra Part IV.A.
9 See infra Part IV.C.
10 See infra Part IV.B (describing empirical strategy).
11 The other is Stuart E. Thiel, Choice of Law and the Home-Court Advantage:  Evi-
dence, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 291, 305 (2000), which uses multivariate regression analysis
to analyze choice-of-law decisions.
12 See infra Part V.B–C.
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I
CHOICE-OF-LAW DOCTRINE
Choice of law is the branch of conflict-of-laws doctrine that seeks
to identify the appropriate law to apply in disputes with connections
to more than one state.13  These connections may be territorial (i.e.,
when the activity sparking the dispute touches the territories of more
than one state) or may be based on legal relationships between a state
and the persons involved (e.g., citizenship).14  In these situations,
more than one state may have a legitimate interest in having its law
applied to the activity.15  Choice-of-law doctrine prescribes how
judges should make choice-of-law decisions—that is, decisions
whether to apply domestic or foreign law to the legal issues before
them.
There is no uniform choice-of-law doctrine in the United States.
To the contrary, different U.S. states have adopted different doctrines,
which use a variety of methods for making choice-of-law decisions.16
Moreover, different methods apply to different types of substantive
legal issues, such as torts and contracts.17  For tort cases—the focus of
this Article’s analysis—Symeon Symeonides classifies the available
methods into seven categories, as listed in Table 1.18
According to the method set forth in the First Restatement of
Conflict of Laws (also called the “traditional” or lex loci delicti
method), the general choice-of-law rule for torts is that a court should
apply “the law of the place of wrong.”19  The First Restatement
defines the place of wrong as “the state where the last event necessary
13 See EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 1.1–.2, at 1–3 (4th ed. 2004)
(defining choice of law).  Although the term “conflicts” is sometimes used to refer to
choice of law, the field of conflict of laws is generally understood as composed of not only
choice of law but also jurisdiction as well as recognition and enforcement of judgments. Id.
at 3.  For comprehensive treatments of the field see generally id. and RUSSELL J.
WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (5th ed. 2006).  Choice-of-law
doctrine varies considerably between nations. See generally MATHIAS REIMANN, CON-
FLICT OF LAWS IN WESTERN EUROPE:  A GUIDE THROUGH THE JUNGLE (1995) (detailing
choice-of-law doctrine in civil law countries).  This Article focuses exclusively on choice-of-
law doctrine in the United States.
14 SCOLES ET AL., supra note 13, § 1.1, at 1.
15 See Michael E. Solimine, An Economic and Empirical Analysis of Choice of Law, 24
GA. L. REV. 49, 62 (1989) (noting that in litigation with interstate elements, more than one
sovereign will inevitably claim governing authority).
16 See infra Table 1 (indicating number of U.S. jurisdictions that have adopted each
choice-of-law method for tort cases).
17 See generally SCOLES ET AL., supra note 13 (surveying choice-of-law methods appli-
cable to domestic relations, torts, contracts, property, and other areas of substantive law).
18 See SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION:  PAST,
PRESENT AND FUTURE 64 tbl.4 (2006) (listing seven categories presented in Table 1 infra).
19 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 378–379 (1934).
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to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place.”20  Usually this
is the location where the plaintiff was injured, since liability does not
arise without injury.21  Thus, under the First Restatement, if the injury
occurs in State A, the judge should apply the law of State A.
TABLE 1
CHOICE-OF-LAW METHODS IN THE UNITED
STATES (TORTS)
Choice-of-Law Method Number of U.S. Jurisdictions
First Restatement 10 (19%)
Significant Contacts 3 (6%)
Interest Analysis 3 (6%)
Second Restatement 23 (44%)
Leflar 5 (10%)
Combined Modern 6 (12%)
Lex Fori 2 (4%)
Total 52
NOTES:  The first column of this table lists the seven categories of choice-of-law methods
identified by Symeonides.  The second column indicates the number of U.S. states (plus the
District of Columbia and Puerto Rico) that have adopted each choice-of-law method for torts
as of 2006. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2006:
Twentieth Annual Survey, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 697, 713 tbl.1 (2006).
Beginning in the 1960s, with the onset of the so-called “American
choice-of-law revolution,” a growing number of states began replacing
the First Restatement method with one of several “modern”
methods.22  One of these modern methods, the “significant contacts”
method, provides that “[t]he state that has the ‘most significant con-
tacts’ with the case and the parties is the center of gravity of the dis-
pute, and thus its law governs . . . .”23
A second, closely related modern method is “interest analysis”:
When domestic and foreign laws conflict, the judge applies the law of
the state with the greater interest in having its law applied24 or the law
of the state whose interests would be most impaired if its law were not
20 Id. § 377.
21 SCOLES ET AL., supra note 13, § 17.2, at 713.
22 For a leading account of this revolution, see Chapter III of SYMEONIDES, supra note
18, at 37–62.
23 Id. at 98–99.
24 SCOLES ET AL., supra note 13, § 2.24, at 102–03.
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applied.25  The introduction of state interests into choice-of-law anal-
ysis was inspired largely by the scholarship of Brainerd Currie.26
According to Currie:
If the court finds that the forum state has no interest in the applica-
tion of its law and policy, but that the foreign state has such an
interest, it should apply the foreign law.  If the court finds that the
forum state has an interest in the application of its law and policy, it
should apply the law of the forum even though the foreign state also
has such an interest, and, a fortiori, it should apply the law of the
forum if the foreign state has no such interest.27
Currie’s approach thus depends on analysis of competing state
interests, but it does not require courts to balance these interests
against those of the forum state.  In fact, Currie was strongly opposed
to such judicial balancing.28  As actually adopted by U.S. states, how-
ever, interest analysis calls on judges to “engage in the very weighing
of state interests that Currie proscribed.”29
The Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws sets forth a third
modern method.  According to the Second Restatement, “[t]he rights
and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are deter-
mined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue,
has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties
under the principles stated in § 6,”30 which enumerates a variety of
policy considerations that should influence judges’ choice-of-law deci-
sions.31  Section 145(2) then provides that, when applying the section 6
25 This version of interest analysis is called the “comparative impairment” method and
was developed by William Baxter. Id. § 2.9, at 31.  It has been adopted by California. Id.
§ 2.24, at 103.
26 See generally BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1963).
27 BRAINERD CURRIE, The Constitution and the Choice of Law:  Governmental Interests
and the Judicial Function, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 26,
at 188, 189.
28 See id. at 182 (“[A]ssessment of the respective values of the competing legitimate
interests of two sovereign states, in order to determine which is to prevail, is a political
function of a very high order.  This is a function that should not be committed to courts in a
democracy.”).
29 SCOLES ET AL., supra note 13, § 2.24, at 103.
30 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(1) (1971).
31 According to section 6:
[T]he factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law include (a) the
needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant policies of
the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative
interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue, (d) the
protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies underlying the partic-
ular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and (g)
ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
Id. § 6(2).
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principles, judges should take into account the place of injury, the
place of conduct, the domicile or nationality of the parties, and the
place of the parties’ relationship.32  The Second Restatement also pro-
vides presumptive choice-of-law rules for specific types of torts.  For
example, section 146 provides that in personal injury cases, the law of
the state where the injury occurred “determines the rights and liabili-
ties of the parties, unless, with respect to the particular issue, some
other state has a more significant relationship under the principles
stated in § 6 to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local
law of the other state will be applied.”33  As Scoles and his co-authors
note, the Second Restatement is a “kindred approach” to the signifi-
cant contacts method; however, “courts following the significant-
contacts approach do not engage in the in-depth policy analysis the
Restatement requires nor are they bound by its presumptive rules.”34
The fourth modern method is known as the Leflar or “better law”
method.  It proposes five “choice-influencing considerations” to help
judges decide which law to apply:  predictability of results, mainte-
nance of interstate and international order, simplification of the judi-
cial task, advancement of the forum’s governmental interest, and
application of the better rule of law.35
Fifth are the “combined modern” approaches that blend interest
analysis with other methods.36  In particular, several states combine
interest analysis with Second Restatement considerations.37  One
“combined modern” state, New York, emphasizes the distinction
between laws that regulate conduct and laws that allocate losses; it has
developed its own relatively clear rules to govern choice-of-law issues
involving the latter.38  When the issue is whether domestic or foreign
law should regulate disputed conduct, New York choice-of-law doc-
trine generally calls for application of the law of the state where the
tort occurred.39  When the issue is allocation of losses resulting from
that conduct, however, New York uses a series of more specific rules.
If the parties are domiciled in the same state, then that state’s law
32 Id. § 145(2).
33 Id. § 146.
34 SCOLES ET AL., supra note 13, § 2.22, at 98.
35 Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 267, 282 (1966).
36 SYMEONIDES, supra note 18, at 115–16.
37 Id. (identifying New Jersey, District of Columbia, Massachusetts, Oregon, Hawaii,
North Dakota, and Pennsylvania as “combined modern” jurisdictions, which employ
interest analysis and Second Restatement factors in at least some contexts).
38 Id. at 101–15.
39 SCOLES ET AL., supra note 13, § 17.48, at 842.
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applies; otherwise, the applicable law depends on a combination of
domicile and the place of conduct and injury.40
Finally, the lex fori method presumes that the law of the judge’s
jurisdiction should apply.41  Depending on the state, this presumption
is rebuttable when the forum state lacks significant contacts with the
case or the parties, the foreign state has an interest in having its law
apply and the forum state’s interests do not mandate that forum law
apply, or the foreign state has an “overwhelming” interest in having
its law apply.42
In the United States, the applicable choice-of-law method is gen-
erally a question of state rather than federal law.43  When federal sub-
ject matter jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, a federal
court must follow the choice-of-law doctrine of the state in which it
sits.44  In non-diversity cases, federal courts generally follow the
Second Restatement.45  For maritime torts with transnational ele-
ments, however, federal courts use a choice-of-law method developed
in a series of U.S. Supreme Court cases beginning with Lauritzen v.
Larsen.46  In Lauritzen, the Supreme Court listed seven factors to
guide maritime choice-of-law decisions:  the place of the wrongful act,
the law of the flag of the ship, the allegiance or domicile of the injured
party, the allegiance of the shipowner, the place of contract, the inac-
cessibility of an alternative foreign forum, and the law of the domestic
40 Id. § 17.47, at 841–42.
41 Id. § 17.15, at 737–41.
42 See SYMEONIDES, supra note 18, at 76–81 (describing circumstances in which forum
law presumption can be rebutted).
43 SCOLES ET AL., supra note 13, § 1.1, at 2.  More specifically, as Symeonides explains,
choice-of-law doctrine is usually part of state common law:
Although each state legislature has the inherent power to enact choice-of-law
legislation, very few states have exercised this power.  Only one state
[Louisiana] has a comprehensive conflicts codification and, although many
other states have piecemeal, narrowly drawn statutes, the great bulk of
American conflicts law is found in the law reports, not the statute books.  It
has been created judicially through the pronouncements of the courts in adju-
dicating conflicts cases and through the operation of the doctrine of stare
decisis.
SYMEONIDES, supra note 18, at 4–5.
44 See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (holding that Erie
doctrine extends to choice of law and federal courts sitting in diversity must therefore
apply state choice-of-law rules).
45 GEORGE A. BERMANN, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION IN A NUTSHELL 224 (2003);
GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED
STATES COURTS 750 (4th ed. 2007).
46 Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953); see also Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398
U.S. 306 (1970) (applying Lauritzen choice-of-law principles); Romero v. Int’l Terminal
Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959) (same).
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forum.47  Later, in Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, the Supreme Court
added an eighth factor, the shipowner’s “base of operations.”48
Courts face both “domestic” and “international” choice-of-law
problems.49  “Domestic” choice-of-law problems involve choosing
between the laws of two different U.S. states.50  In this context,
“domestic” or “forum” law refers to the law of the U.S. state in which
the court sits; “foreign law” refers to the law of the other U.S. state.
“International” choice-of-law problems require a court to choose
between United States, or a U.S. state’s, law on the one hand and the
law of a foreign nation-state (or a governmental subunit thereof) on
the other hand.51  In this context, “domestic” law or “forum” law
again refers to the law of the forum state, “foreign state” refers to a
foreign nation-state, and “foreign law” refers to the law of that foreign
nation-state.52
U.S. judges generally apply the same choice-of-law methods
described above in both domestic and international contexts (except
for the Lauritzen method, which applies only in transnational mari-
time cases).53  However, this Article takes international choice of law
47 Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 583–91.
48 398 U.S. at 308–09.
49 SYMEONIDES, supra note 18, at 3–4.
50 Id. (describing “horizontal” interstate conflicts).
51 See id. (defining “international (state) conflicts” as conflicts between laws of U.S.
states and laws of foreign countries and “international (federal) conflicts” as conflicts
between laws of United States and laws of foreign countries).
52 Alternatively, the relevant “foreign law” may be the law of a governmental subunit
of a federally-organized foreign nation-state, such as the law of a Canadian province.
53 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 10 (1971) (“The rules in
the Restatement of this Subject apply to cases with elements in one or more States of the
United States and are generally applicable to cases with elements in one or more foreign
nations.”).  My data confirm this tendency:  Except for transnational maritime cases, all of
the randomly selected international choice-of-law decisions in my dataset used one of the
seven choice-of-law doctrines identified in Table 1 supra.  This tendency to apply the same
solutions to domestic and international choice-of-law problems is part of a broader ten-
dency in U.S. courts to solve transnational problems using domestic analogues. See
Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, the Proposed Hague Convention, and
Progress in National Law, in A GLOBAL LAW OF JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS:  LESSONS
FROM THE HAGUE 117, 122 (John J. Barcelo III & Kevin M. Clermont eds., 2002) (“This
disposition to assimilate international to domestic interjurisdictional cases has been rein-
forced by the very powerful impulse of modern American procedural law, including choice
of law for these purposes, to apply the same rules to all cases.”); Paul R. Dubinsky, Is
Transnational Litigation a Distinct Field?  The Persistence of Exceptionalism in American
Procedural Law, 44 STAN. J. INT’L L. 301, 307–08 (2008) (noting this practice as part of
broader phenomenon of “interstate-international equivalence” whereby U.S. judges and
scholars tend to “approach transnational scenarios from the perspective of interstate
frameworks”).  Whether or not choice-of-law doctrine should distinguish between
domestic and international problems is much debated. Compare ROBERT A. LEFLAR ET
AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 6, at 9–11 (4th ed. 1986) (arguing that existence of dif-
ferences between international and domestic contexts “does not mean that a separate set
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as its subject in order to investigate the relationship between choice of
law and global governance.54
II
THE “MESS” CLAIMS
The foregoing overview describes what legal doctrine says about
choice of law; but what doctrine says is not necessarily what judges
do.55  In fact, choice-of-law scholars tend to be deeply skeptical about
whether legal doctrine plays a significant role in judges’ choice-of-law
decisionmaking.56  This Part documents five widely made claims that
inform this skepticism and have led scholars to conclude that choice of
law is a “mess”:  (1) choice-of-law doctrine does not significantly influ-
ence judges’ choice-of-law decisions; instead, (2) these decisions are
biased in favor of domestic over foreign law, (3) they are biased in
favor of domestic over foreign parties, and (4) they are biased in favor
of plaintiffs over defendants; and (5) these decisions are highly
unpredictable.
A. The Marginal Influence of Choice-of-Law Doctrine
The first “mess” claim is that choice-of-law doctrine does not sig-
nificantly influence judges’ choice-of-law decisionmaking.  One might
expect the differences among the choice-of-law methods discussed in
Part I to lead to different outcomes in choice-of-law cases.  But in a
leading modern treatise, Eugene Scoles, Peter Hay, Patrick Borchers,
and Symeon Symeonides assert that “methodology rarely drives judi-
cial decisions.”57  According to Symeonides, “of all the factors that
may affect the outcome of a conflicts case, the factor that is the most
inconsequential is the choice-of-law methodology followed by the
court.”58  Similarly, Stewart Sterk concludes that “choice of law
of conflicts rules for international cases can or should be devised”) with ALBERT A.
EHRENZWEIG, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 19–21 (1967) (arguing for separation of doc-
trine applicable to domestic and international conflicts).
54 See infra Part III.
55 Cf. Patrick J. Borchers, The Choice-of-Law Revolution:  An Empirical Study, 49
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 357, 358 (1992) (“[W]hat courts do, not what they say, is impor-
tant.”); William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Prologomenon to an Empirical
Restatement of Conflicts, 75 IND. L.J. 417, 427 (2000) (encouraging empirical choice-of-law
scholarship that, following legal realists, seeks to understand “what courts do, rather than
what they say”).
56 This skepticism is not unlike that which pervades social science scholarship on law
and courts. See Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, 4 PERSP. ON POL. 261, 262 (2006)
(“[R]eflecting an almost pathological skepticism that law matters, positive scholars of
courts and judicial behavior simply fail to take law and legal institutions seriously.”).
57 SCOLES ET AL., supra note 13, § 2.19, at 83.
58 Symeonides, supra note 2, at 2.
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theory exerts at best a marginal influence on choice of law
decisions.”59
A different version of the marginal-influence claim asserts that it
does matter whether judges use the First Restatement or one of the
modern methods but that which modern method is used does not sig-
nificantly influence choice-of-law decisions.60  For example, Patrick
Borchers concludes that “[c]ourts do not take the new approaches
seriously.  Because all of the [modern] competitors to the First
Restatement start from different analytical premises, if courts were
faithful to their tenets they would inevitably generate different result
patterns.  Yet in practice the outcomes are largely indistinguish-
able.”61  According to Shirley Wiegand, “it appears [that] it does not
matter too much what modern methodology courts follow.”62
These marginal-influence claims are based on two assumptions.
First, they assume that modern choice-of-law methods are indetermi-
nate.  Sterk, for example, argues that “modern choice of law theory
provides ample authority to permit a court to reach virtually any
result in any litigated case.”63  Likewise, Borchers reasons that the
new approaches “perform nearly identically in practice [because]
none of them is much of a check on judicial discretion.”64  The title of
a commentary by Michael Gottesman, “Adrift on the Sea of Indeter-
minacy,”65 reflects this view of choice-of-law doctrine.
The second assumption is that judges’ biases are driving choice-
of-law decisionmaking.  As Larry Kramer puts it, “judges really do
seem driven by their desire to apply a preferred substantive law
without regard for independent choice of law considerations.”66  Or,
as Borchers suggests, “the new theories usually amount to little more
than long-winded excuses to do what courts wanted to do in the first
place.”67
59 Sterk, supra note 2, at 951.
60 See Patrick J. Borchers, Empiricism and Theory in Conflicts Law, 75 IND. L.J. 509,
509 (2000) (referring to this view as “widely held”).
61 Borchers, supra note 55, at 379.
62 Wiegand, supra note 5, at 21.
63 Sterk, supra note 2, at 987; see also Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, Lex Loci
Delictus and Global Economic Welfare: Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 120 HARV. L.
REV. 1137, 1137 (2007) (“[M]odern choice-of-law methodologies are famously indetermi-
nate . . . .”); Levin, supra note 1, at 251 (“[M]any contemporary scholars agree that, in
practice, the various doctrinal approaches do not provide much guidance for, or constraints
on, judges at all.”).
64 Borchers, supra note 55, at 379–80.
65 Michael H. Gottesman, Adrift on the Sea of Indeterminacy, 75 IND. L.J. 527 (2000).
66 Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1990:  Trends and Develop-
ments, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 465, 466 (1991).
67 Borchers, supra note 55, at 382.
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B. Biases in Choice-of-Law Decisionmaking
The next three commonly voiced mess claims point to specific
supposed biases in choice-of-law decisionmaking.  These claims assert
that choice-of-law decisions are biased in favor of domestic law,
domestic litigants, and plaintiffs.
1. Pro-Domestic-Law Bias
Choice-of-law scholars widely assume that choice-of-law deci-
sionmaking is biased strongly in favor of domestic law—that is, the
law of the forum.68  For example, Joseph Singer states that “[i]n prac-
tice, it is quite clear that what courts ordinarily do in conflicts cases is
to apply forum law.”69  Larry Ribstein argues that “even if courts
apply the laws of other states under choice-of-law clauses, they will
apply forum law most often across their whole range of cases.”70
Louise Weinberg similarly notes that “historically, forum law has been
the overwhelming judicial choice.”71
The claim is not necessarily that this bias inheres in judges.  Some
instead attribute it to the modern choice-of-law methods themselves,
such as interest analysis and the Second Restatement, which have sub-
stantially replaced the First Restatement’s approach.72  Friedrich
68 See, e.g., SCOLES ET AL., supra note 13, at 107 (noting “homeward trend” in
American choice of law); Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law:  New Foundations, 90 GEO.
L.J. 883, 893 (2002) (“[J]udges tend to be biased in favor of local law . . . .”); Erin Ann
O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, Conflict of Laws and Choice of Law, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
LAW AND ECONOMICS 631, 639 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000)
(“[J]udges are always tempted . . . to apply more easily ascertained local laws.”); Antony L.
Ryan, Principles of Forum Selection, 103 W. VA. L. REV. 167, 192 (2000) (“One feature of
many modern approaches . . . is a marked tendency to apply the law of the forum (the lex
fori).”); Joseph William Singer, A Pragmatic Guide to Conflicts, 70 B.U. L. REV. 731, 746
(1990) (“In general, the courts tend to apply forum law to benefit plaintiffs . . . .”); Sterk,
supra note 2, at 968 (“[I]n many tort cases . . . courts find little reason to depart from forum
law . . . .”); Thiel, supra note 11, at 293 (“[J]udges . . . exhibit a tendency to apply their own
forum law.”); Willis L.M. Reese, Conflict of Laws, 33 AM. J. COMP. L. 332, 335 (1985)
(reviewing EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1984)) (“[T]he great
majority of the choice-of-law cases that have arisen in tort have resulted in the application
of a local law rule favorable to the plaintiff.”); see also SYMEONIDES, supra note 18, at 334
(noting “widely held assumption” that courts applying modern methods have very strong
pro-forum-law biases).
69 Singer, supra note 3, at 59.
70 Larry E. Ribstein, From Efficiency to Politics in Contractual Choice of Law, 37 GA.
L. REV. 363, 431 (2003).
71 Louise Weinberg, Theory Wars in the Conflict of Laws, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1631, 1652
(2005).
72 See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 55, at 359 (noting frequently made assertion that new
theories are pro-forum-law); Brilmayer, supra note 4, at 398 (arguing that Currie’s version
of interest analysis has “three discernible biases:  pro-resident, pro-forum-law, and pro-
recovery”); Laycock, supra note 5, at 251 (asserting that “[c]hoice-of-law rules . . . [should]
not prefer forum law to the law of sister states” and arguing that “[m]any modern choice-
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Juenger argues that the modern approaches have an “inherent forum
law preference.”73  According to Jack Goldsmith and Alan Sykes,
“compared to the lex loci rule, the modern rules have one unmistak-
able consequence:  they make it more likely that the forum court will
apply local tort law to wrongs that occurred in another jurisdiction.”74
As Ralph Whitten summarizes, “[b]oth the empirical evidence and the
existing scholarly consensus . . . indicate that there is a strong ten-
dency under all modern conflicts systems to apply forum law.”75
2. Pro-Domestic-Party Bias
Another common mess claim is that judges’ choice-of-law deci-
sions are biased in favor of domestic litigants.76  According to
Brilmayer, the new theories are “pro-resident.”77  And Erin O’Hara
and Larry Ribstein note that “judges are always tempted to defect
from individual rules in favor of local litigants.”78  This claim is consis-
tent with more general claims of anti-foreigner bias in U.S. courts.79
of-law theories violate [that] principle”); Giesela Rühl, Methods and Approaches in Choice
of Law:  An Economic Perspective, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 801, 839 (2006) (“[T]he
American standards that emerged in the course of the American conflicts revolution . . .
have mostly served as a justification for application of the law that the courts know best.”);
Robert A. Sedler, Interest Analysis and Forum Preference in the Conflict of Laws:  A
Response to the ‘New Critics’, 34 MERCER L. REV. 593, 595 (1983) (“[T]he forum[,] . . .
regardless of its purported approach to choice of law[,] . . . generally will end up applying
its own law . . . .”); Solimine, supra note 15, at 87 (stating that pro-forum hypothesis
“appears to be confirmed”).
73 FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE 148 (spec. ed.
2005).
74 Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 63, at 1137.
75 Whitten, supra note 3, at 560.
76 See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 55, at 359 (noting frequently made assertion that “the
actual operation of the new choice-of-law theories . . . [is] ‘pro-resident’”); Brilmayer,
supra note 4, at 398 (arguing that Currie’s version of interest analysis has pro-resident
bias); Laycock, supra note 5, at 251 (asserting principle that “[c]hoice-of-law rules [should]
not prefer local citizens to citizens of a sister state” and arguing that “[m]any modern
choice-of-law theories violate [this] principle”); see also Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of
Law in the American Courts in 2006:  Twentieth Annual Survey, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 697,
738 (2006) (referring to pro-local-party claim as “common assumption”).
77 Brilmayer, supra note 4, at 398.
78 O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 68, at 639.
79 See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, Xenophobia in American Courts, 97 NW. U. L. REV.
1497, 1520 (2003) (“Our empirical results . . . substantiate the existence of xenophobic bias
in the American courts with American juries in patent suits.”); see also Utpal
Bhattacharya, Neal Galpin & Bruce Haslem, The Home Court Advantage in International
Corporate Litigation, 50 J.L. & ECON. 625, 629 (2007) (“Our article supports the conclu-
sion of [Kimberly A.] Moore (2003):  foreign firms are disadvantaged in U.S. courts.”).
But see Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia or Xenophobia in U.S.
Courts?  Before and After 9/11, 4 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 441, 464 (2007) (finding that for-
eigners have higher win-rates than domestic parties, and concluding that “the data offer no
support for the existence of xenophobic bias in U.S. courts”).
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3. Pro-Plaintiff Bias
In addition to pro-domestic-law and pro-domestic-party biases,
choice-of-law scholars often assert that judges’ choice-of-law decisions
have a pro-recovery bias—that is, they favor plaintiffs.80  According to
Solimine, for example, “the modern theories of choice of law, at least
in application, are inevitably pro-recovery.”81  Likewise, Borchers
finds that judges have a “strong prorecovery bent.”82
C. The Unpredictability of Choice-of-Law Decisionmaking
The final mess claim is that judges’ choice-of-law decisions have
become highly unpredictable as a result of the American choice-of-
law revolution’s shift from the First Restatement’s relatively rigid
place-of-the-wrong (or lex loci delicti) rule to the highly flexible
modern approaches.83  Choice of law was fairly predictable under the
80 See, e.g., Brilmayer, supra note 4, at 398–99 (arguing that Currie’s version of interest
analysis has pro-recovery bias); Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp:  The
Case for Federal Choice of Law Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1, 9 (1991) (arguing that modern
choice-of-law approaches give “a distinct advantage to the party initiating the lawsuit”);
Michael I. Krauss, Product Liability and Game Theory:  One More Trip to the Choice-of-
Law Well, 2002 BYU L. REV. 759, 791, 795 (arguing that “plaintiffs fare better in ‘interest
analysis’ states, on average, than do defendants” (emphasis omitted) and that modern
movement from traditional rules to interest analysis “has been a shift from one conflicts
rule favoring local plaintiffs to a different rule that favors local plaintiffs even more”);
Reese, supra note 68, at 335 (“[T]he great majority of the choice-of-law cases that have
arisen in tort have resulted in the application of a local law rule favorable to the plain-
tiff.”); Singer, supra note 68, at 746 (“In general, the courts tend to apply forum law to
benefit plaintiffs . . . .”); see also SYMEONIDES, supra note 18, at 332 (noting “widely-held
assumption” that courts favor plaintiffs in choice-of-law decisions); cf. JUENGER, supra
note 73, at 149 (“[O]n the whole the current doctrines have, in practical application,
strengthened the protection of multistate accident victims by filtering out substandard torts
rules.”). But see SCOLES ET AL., supra note 13, § 17.1, at 712–13 (suggesting that pro-
plaintiff bias may be subsiding).
81 Solimine, supra note 15, at 93.
82 Borchers, supra note 55, at 380.
83 See, e.g., SCOLES ET AL., supra note 13, § 17.33, at 786 (arguing that modern methods
are “flexible, perhaps too flexible,” resulting in “conspicuous judicial polyphony”);
SYMEONIDES, supra note 18, at 423 (arguing that choice-of-law revolution “went too far in
denouncing all choice-of-law rules,” leading to “an unprecedented degree of judicial flexi-
bility in choice-of-law decisions”); Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 63, at 1137 (“[The]
modern choice-of-law methodologies are famously indeterminate and do not permit sys-
tematic generalizations about which substantive tort law governs in particular cases.”);
Laycock, supra note 5, at 319 (“No set of choice-of-law rules has yet achieved a high
degree of predictability . . . .”); Levin, supra note 1, at 251 (“[M]any contemporary scholars
agree that, in practice, the various doctrinal approaches do not provide much guidance for,
or constraints on, judges at all.”); Alan Reed, The Anglo-American Revolution in Tort
Choice of Law Principles:  Paradigm Shift or Pandora’s Box, 18 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
867, 878, 898 (2001) (arguing that choice-of-law revolution “has only increased obfuscation
in an area characterized more by mud than by crystal” and that “[t]he tale of American
choice of law principles has become the story of a thousand and one inconsistent tort
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First Restatement because of its clear place-of-injury rule for torts,84
but the modern methods “allow wide areas of discretion.”85  As a
result, “it has become difficult to predict what a court will do when
faced with choice of law issues, and each case seems to demand an ad
hoc determination.”86  Similarly, O’Hara and Ribstein express con-
cern that modern choice-of-law methods “undermine predictability.”87
As Symeonides puts it, the choice-of-law revolution “has gone too far
in embracing flexibility to the exclusion of all certainty.”88
In sum, for a variety of reasons, many critics have claimed that
choice of law is a mess, characterized by too much discretion, bias, and
unpredictability.
III
INTERNATIONAL CHOICE OF LAW, THE MESS CLAIMS, AND
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
If the mess claims are correct, this would be bad news for global
governance, since one of its central concerns is determining who gov-
cases”); Weinberg, supra note 71, at 1645 (arguing that Second Restatement has led to “a
predictably large quotient of arbitrary and unjust results”); see also Solimine, supra note
15, at 49–50 (noting criticism that modern approaches lack predictability and “permit free-
wheeling and unprincipled choices by judges”).
84 Wiegand, supra note 5, at 2.  Notwithstanding the place-of-injury rule, various
“escape devices” may reduce the First Restatement’s predictability.  O’Hara & Ribstein,
supra note 68, at 632.
85 Wiegand, supra note 5, at 4.
86 Id.
87 O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 68, at 636–37.
88 SYMEONIDES, supra note 18, at 425.  It should be noted, however, that some scholars
argue that even if choice-of-law decisions cannot be predicted based on the factors
expressly identified by choice-of-law doctrine, they could be predicted if one discovered
the “true rules” that judges actually use to make those decisions. See Albert A.
Ehrenzweig, A Proper Law in a Proper Forum:  A “Restatement” of the “Lex Fori
Approach,” 18 OKLA. L. REV. 340, 340–44 (1965) (coining term “true rules”).  As Richman
and Reynolds explain, Ehrenzweig searched for “a set of rules or generalizations that in
fact predict the decisions of courts in choice-of-law cases,” rules not deduced from choice-
of-law theory but rather “induced or abstracted from the tendencies of courts to reach
certain choice-of-law results regardless of their announced methodology.”  Richman &
Reynolds, supra note 55, at 432; see also SYMEONIDES, supra note 18, at 427 (“Fortunately,
and importantly, despite the lack of [doctrinal] guidance . . . judicial decisions have pro-
duced much more consistent results than the critics assume.”); Sedler, supra note 72, at 598
(asserting that choice-of-law outcomes in tort cases “tend to fall into certain fact-law pat-
terns”); Singer, supra note 68, at 746 (rejecting notion that “we cannot predict how courts
will rule on choice-of-law questions” and noting that “[i]n general, the courts tend to apply
forum law to benefit plaintiffs”); Sterk, supra note 2, at 977 (referring to “remarkable
consistency in tort cases involving localized activity”).  Consistent plaintiff, domestic-law,
or forum bias might serve as such a predictable “true rule.”
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erns.89  For example, which state’s law should govern activity with
connections to multiple states?  The answer is not obvious; multiple
connections mean that more than one state may have a legitimate
interest in having its law apply.90  By answering this basic “who gov-
erns” question, a choice-of-law system can have potentially important
consequences for global governance.91  In theory, it can increase or
decrease global economic welfare, enhance or undermine transna-
tional rule of law, and facilitate or hinder transnational bargaining.
This Part argues that the extent of these effects, and whether they are
beneficial or harmful, depends largely on the extent to which choice-
of-law doctrine actually influences judges’ international choice-of-law
decisions and the extent to which those decisions are biased and
unpredictable.  According to the mess claims, choice-of-law doctrine
does not significantly influence choice-of-law decisionmaking, which is
biased and highly unpredictable.  The mess claims thus imply that if
choice of law has any systematic effects on global governance, they
are likely to be harmful.
A. Global Economic Welfare
According to theories developed by law-and-economics scholars,
choice-of-law rules can have an important influence on global eco-
nomic welfare.92  These scholars generally posit one of two basic
causal mechanisms to explain this relationship.  The first involves pri-
vate activity.  Some states have more efficient substantive laws than
others in the sense that they create stronger incentives for private
actors to engage in welfare-enhancing activity and refrain from
welfare-reducing activity.93  Choice-of-law rules enhance global eco-
89 See Christopher A. Whytock, Domestic Courts and Global Governance, 84 TUL. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 8–22), available at http://ssrn.com/author=386558
(discussing judicial allocation of global governance authority).
90 Id. at 21.
91 Id. at 12–13 (analyzing relationship between international choice-of-law decision-
making and global governance).
92 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. WHINCOP & MARY KEYES, POLICY AND PRAGMATISM IN THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 27–30 (2001) (arguing that properly designed choice-of-law rules can
minimize social costs of litigation, facilitate international coordination, facilitate optimal
contracting, and limit regulatory monopolies and spillovers); Guzman, supra note 68, at
885–86 (“[T]he objective of a choice-of-law regime should be to provide a legal ordering
that goes as far as possible toward maximizing global welfare.”).  For a very useful over-
view of different theories regarding the global economic implications of choice-of-law sys-
tems, see Ralf Michaels, Two Economists, Three Opinions?  Economic Models for Private
International Law—Cross-Border Torts as Example, in AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PRI-
VATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 143, 146 (Jürgen Basedow & Toshiyuki Kono eds., 2006).
93 See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 196–98
(2004) (arguing that in unilateral accident cases, strict liability is socially optimal tort rule,
whereas ordinary negligence is sub-optimal).
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nomic welfare if they result in application of the more efficient sub-
stantive law.94
The second mechanism involves substantive lawmaking by gov-
ernments.  Governments ordinarily consider the domestic costs and
benefits of proposed laws, but they do not necessarily account for
extraterritorial costs and benefits.95  As a result, governments may
adopt laws that are efficient domestically but inefficient globally.96
Choice-of-law rules can increase global economic welfare by encour-
aging governments to internalize extraterritorial costs, resulting in
substantive laws that are more efficient globally.97  For example, Erin
O’Hara and Larry Ribstein argue that choice-of-law rules favoring the
law contractually selected by the parties to a transaction can foster
inter-jurisdictional competition for more efficient laws.98  According
to this theory, if transnational actors are free to contract around ineffi-
cient substantive legal rules, then states will need to compete for legal
business by efficiently revising their laws.99
The mess claims challenge these law-and-economics theories
regarding the impact of choice-of-law systems on global welfare.  Most
fundamentally, the mess claims imply that choice-of-law rules are
94 See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 68, at 896 (“In framing choice-of-law rules, the objec-
tive should be to identify and implement rules that will permit transactions to take place
when the total impact on welfare is positive, and prevent transactions from taking place
when the total impact on welfare is negative.”); Michaels, supra note 92, at 153 (“For a
private law model, an economic analysis . . . should focus on individuals as rational agents
and set private international law rules so as to give the optimal incentives to these individ-
uals in order to maximize global social welfare.”).
95 Guzman, supra note 68, at 897.
96 See id. (“For example, a government will permit activities whose impact on global
welfare is negative if the costs are borne by foreigners and the benefits are enjoyed
locally.”).
97 See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 68, at 897 (“[C]hoice-of-law rules should be crafted to
encourage governments to internalize the costs of their actions (and to allow them to inter-
nalize the benefits).”); Michaels, supra note 92, at 173 (“Private international law rules are
efficient if they give states the incentives to pass substantive laws that in turn give individ-
uals the right incentives for efficient conduct.”); Emanuela Carbonara & Francesco Parisi,
Choice of Law and Legal Evolution:  Rethinking the Market for Legal Rules 2–3 (Univ. of
Minn. Law Sch. Legal Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 07-38, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1011376 (starting from premise that “competition among legal
rules can significantly affect the evolution of law” and arguing that poorly designed choice-
of-law rules allow inefficient substantive law to persist, whereas well-designed choice-of-
law rules can facilitate evolution toward efficient substantive laws).
98 O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 68, at 643.
99 Id.  Law-and-economics scholars continue to debate the strength of the assumption
that states have an incentive to promote selection of their law. See id. at 644–45 (dis-
cussing competing theories of state motivation to compete for efficient laws); Rühl, supra
note 72, at 813–14 (discussing plausibility of this assumption and noting possibility that this
logic may result in “race-to-the-bottom” (i.e., toward inefficient laws) rather than “race-to-
the-top”).
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unlikely to have systemic economic consequences, beneficial or
harmful.  In effect, the law-and-economics theories posit an explana-
tory variable, an intervening variable, and a dependent variable:  They
hypothesize that choice-of-law rules (the explanatory variable) influ-
ence private and governmental behavior (the intervening variable),
which in turn affects global welfare (the dependent variable).  How-
ever, another variable intervenes:  judges.  If the mess claims are cor-
rect, this intervening variable breaks the causal chain, because choice-
of-law rules do not significantly influence judges’ choice-of-law
decisions and those decisions are unpredictable.100  The mess claims
therefore suggest that even optimally designed choice-of-law rules are
likely to have neither the behavioral consequences nor the welfare
effects hypothesized by law-and-economics theorists.101
Even if choice of law does have global economic consequences,
the mess claims imply that those consequences are likely to be
harmful since choice-of-law decisions are biased in favor of domestic
100 See LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS:  FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
§ 4.3.2, at 173 (1991) (“If people cannot ascertain the applicable rules, or if they have no
way of knowing the probability that it will cover the conduct they contemplate, they are
less able to conform their conduct to the rule and the state cannot use legal rules to influ-
ence their behavior.”); Michaels, supra note 92, at 156 (“Ex-ante predictability enables
parties to optimise their conduct vis-à-vis the incentives set by the applicable tort rules.”).
101 This does not mean that choice-of-law doctrine cannot independently influence
behavior (although if it is too indeterminate to guide judges’ decisions, it is also likely to be
too indeterminate to guide the behavior of transnational actors), but it does mean that
doctrine’s influence depends largely on how judges actually apply it.  Insofar as judges do
not make choice-of-law decisions in accordance with the applicable choice-of-law doctrine,
and transnational actors know this, the doctrine is likely to have a substantially diminished
influence on the actors’ behavior.  Rule-based choice-of-law methods may more effectively
limit judicial discretion than standards-based methods, resulting in greater doctrinal influ-
ence and more predictable choice-of-law decisions. See Rühl, supra note 72, at 832 (“Com-
pliance costs . . . are usually low for rules because their simplicity and clarity makes them
easily accessible.  For standards, in contrast, the costs of determining the content are usu-
ally high because individuals have to engage in the difficult, if not at times impossible,
prediction of how a court will eventually determine the desired degree and level of con-
duct.”).  Thus, the version of the marginal-influence-of-doctrine claim that focuses its criti-
cism on the modern methods rather than the more rule-like First Restatement, see supra
notes 60–62 and accompanying text, seems to leave open the possibility that choice-of-law
methods could be developed which would both influence judges’ decisions and be econom-
ically efficient.  In fact, some law-and-economics scholars argue that the First Restatement
itself is economically efficient, at least compared with the modern methods. See Goldsmith
& Sykes, supra note 63, at 1143–47 (making economic argument in favor of First
Restatement’s lex loci delicti approach).  The problem is that the First Restatement allows
judges to deviate from the ostensibly predictable and certain place-of-wrong tort rule by
means of “escape devices.”  As a result, the mess claims may describe the First Restate-
ment more accurately than the place-of-wrong rule alone would suggest, and thus it may
not foster the posited economic efficiencies. See Borchers, supra note 55, at 365 (noting
two such escape devices:  recharacterization and public policy exception).
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law.102  For example, one recent critique of modern choice-of-law
methods begins with the proposition that the modern methods “make
it more likely that the forum court will apply local tort law to wrongs
that occurred in another jurisdiction.”103  This gives transnational tort
plaintiffs an incentive to sue in the United States to take advantage of
more plaintiff-friendly tort law.104  However, under U.S. rules of per-
sonal jurisdiction, these plaintiffs can only sue in U.S. courts against
U.S. firms and firms with close U.S. connections.105  U.S. firms there-
fore suffer disproportionately:  “Non-U.S. firms that operate outside
the United States are potentially subject to lower tort liabilities for
their activities than their U.S. competitors in the same markets.”106
This causes global welfare-reducing inefficiencies:  “Other things
being equal, the greater the cost disadvantage suffered by U.S. firms
when they are subjected to U.S. tort standards on a discriminatory
basis, the greater the degree to which less efficient competitors who
do not confront such liability will displace the U.S. firms.”107  The seri-
ousness of the resulting harm to global economic welfare depends on
the extent to which judges’ choice-of-law decisions—particularly deci-
sions based on the modern methods—are actually biased in favor of
domestic law.  By asserting that this bias is strong, the mess claims
imply that this economic harm may be substantial.
B. Transnational Rule of Law
“At its core,” writes Brian Tamanaha, the rule of law “requires
that government officials and citizens are bound by and act consistent
with the law.”  Accordingly, Tamanaha argues, the law must conform
to “a set of minimal characteristics:  [it] must be set forth in advance
(be prospective), be made public, be general, be clear, be stable and
102 See, e.g., Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 63, 1147 (concluding that pro-domestic-law
bias of modern methods reduces global economic welfare); Guzman, supra note 68, at 908
(arguing that interest analysis is flawed from efficiency perspective because its pro-
domestic-law tendency leads to systematic overregulation).
103 Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 63, at 1137.
104 See id. (“The substantive tort law and related procedural mechanisms available in
U.S. courts are generally much more favorable to plaintiffs, and produce much larger
recoveries, than the law and procedures available in foreign courts.”).
105 Id. at 1144.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 1145–46.  Goldsmith and Sykes summarize their argument as follows:
U.S. personal jurisdiction rules combine with modern choice-of-law rules to
apply U.S. tort laws discriminatorily to U.S. firms in a way that, under standard
principles of trade law, can reduce global welfare. Lex loci eliminates this dis-
torting economic effect by ensuring that all firms are subject to the same stan-
dard of liability for torts committed in a particular place.
Id. at 1147.
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certain, and be applied to everyone according to its terms.”108
Whether global governance possesses these rule-of-law characteristics
depends partly on whether international choice-of-law decision-
making is unbiased, predictable, and based on publicly announced
choice-of-law rules.
For example, the rule of law requires that judges, as officials of
the state, make decisions based on “public, prospective laws, with the
qualities of generality, equality of application, and certainty.”109  But
according to the mess claims, judges make international choice-of-law
decisions based on factors other than “public, prospective” choice-of-
law rules.  Worse, contrary to the principles of generality and equality
of application, the mess claims suggest that the dispositive factors in
these decisions are various biases—biases in favor of domestic law,
domestic litigants, and plaintiffs.  Moreover, because it is highly
unpredictable, international choice-of-law decisionmaking reduces
rather than increases certainty.
The rule of law also requires that actors generally comply with
applicable legal rules.110  Focal point,111 reputational,112 and norma-
108 Brian Z. Tamanaha, A Concise Guide to the Rule of Law 3 (St. John’s Univ. Sch. of
Law Legal Stud. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 07-0082, 2007), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1012051.
109 BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW:  HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 119
(2004).
110 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
111 See generally Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA.
L. REV. 1649 (2000) (describing focal point theory of legal compliance).  Focal point theory
is based on one of the central insights of game theory:  Often there will be “multiple paths
toward capturing the gains from cooperation and no obvious way for a set of decentralized
actors to converge on one of them.”  Geoffrey Garrett & Barry R. Weingast, Ideas, Inter-
ests, and Institutions:  Constructing the European Community’s Internal Market, in IDEAS
AND FOREIGN POLICY:  BELIEFS, INSTITUTIONS, AND POLITICAL CHANGE 173, 175 (Judith
Goldstein & Robert O. Keohane eds., 1993).  In game-theoretic terms, this is the folk the-
orem for repeated games, according to which there can be many equilibria in a single
game. HERBERT GINTIS, GAME THEORY EVOLVING:  A PROBLEM-CENTERED INTRODUC-
TION TO MODELING STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR 126 (2000).  If actors follow different paths,
they will not enjoy these gains; but absent direct communication, they may not know on
which path to converge.  This is known as a coordination problem.  However, if one path
stands out from the others in such a way that each actor expects other actors to take that
same path, then actors in general will tend to take that path, thus solving the coordination
problem. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 54–55 (1980).  Impor-
tantly, there must be a common understanding among the relevant actors about what this
path is.  McAdams, supra, at 1657.  Such a path is called a “focal point.”  As McAdams
argues, “law is one means of creating a focal point, and therefore, one means of achieving
coordination.  Even without threatening sanctions, the state can focus attention on one of
several equilibrium solutions to a coordination game by commanding or merely recom-
mending that individuals coordinate around that solution.” Id. at 1663.  In these situations,
because the law helps solve actors’ coordination problems, they have a reason to comply
even without enforcement. Id. at 1666.
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tive113 processes may all contribute to compliance by transnational
actors.114  All three processes require that transnational actors have
some degree of certainty about the applicable legal rules.  Otherwise,
actors cannot identify the relevant focal point around which they
should coordinate their behavior.  Nor can they know which law to
use as a standard for determining the reputational costs of particular
behavior or as a source of norms for assessing the appropriateness of
that behavior.115  A choice-of-law system can enhance compliance by
112 See ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS:  A RATIONAL
CHOICE THEORY 33–41 (2008) (setting forth reputational theory of legal compliance).
According to reputational theories, if an actor’s reputation for compliance is good, that
reputation will increase the actor’s opportunities for entering into profitable transactions
with other actors who are aware of that reputation.  If that reputation is bad, it will
decrease those opportunities.  Therefore, an actor’s reputation for complying with legal
obligations is a valuable asset.  The actor has an incentive to comply with legal obligations
because noncompliance will harm that reputation. See David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions
in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 373, 393 (1990) (explaining this general
logic); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions, in
POLITICAL SCIENCE:  THE SCIENCE OF POLITICS 51, 71 (Herbert F. Weisberg ed., 1986)
(same); GUZMAN, supra, ch. 3, at 71–117 (applying this logic to explain compliance with
international law).
113 See James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The Institutional Dynamics of International
Political Orders, 52 INT’L ORG. 943, 949–52 (1998) (distinguishing normative processes of
compliance from instrumental processes driven by “logic of expected consequences”).  The
focal point and reputational theories of compliance are based on a behavioral logic of
anticipated consequences:  They both “see actions as driven by expectations of conse-
quences” and “imagine that human actors choose among alternatives by evaluating their
likely consequences for personal or collective objectives, conscious that other actors are
doing likewise.” See id. at 949 (describing logic of anticipated consequences).  But compli-
ance can also be explained by a logic of appropriateness, according to which actions are
rule-based. See id. at 951 (explaining that according to logic of appropriateness, “[h]uman
actors are imagined to follow rules that associate particular identities to particular situa-
tions” and “[a]ction involves evoking an identity or role and matching the obligations of
that identity or role to a specific situation”).  From this perspective, actors are understood
as “acting in accordance with rules and practices that are socially constructed, publicly
known, anticipated, and accepted.” Id. at 952.
114 See Christopher A. Whytock, Thinking Beyond the Domestic-International Divide:
Toward a Unified Concept of Public Law, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 155, 170–85 (2004) (providing
overview of all three processes).
115 Cf. BRILMAYER, supra note 100, § 4.3.2, at 173 (arguing that choice-of-law rules must
be clear in order to influence individual behavior); Johan P. Olsen, Understanding Institu-
tions and Logics of Appropriateness:  Introductory Essay 6 (Arena Ctr. for European
Studies, Univ. of Oslo, Working Paper No. 13, 2007), available at http://www.arena.uio.no/
publications/working-papers2007/papers/wp07_13.xml (noting that “[t]he clarity and con-
sistency of rules and identities are variables” and that actors may find it particularly chal-
lenging to act according to logic of appropriateness “when several institutions structured
according to different principles and rules provide competing analyses and behavioral pre-
scriptions for the same area of action”).  In fact, if actors are too uncertain about the appli-
cable rule, they may revert to non-rule-based consequentialist decisionmaking. See March
& Olsen, supra note 113, at 952 (“When preferences and consequences are precise and
identities or their rules are ambiguous, a logic of consequences tends to be more
important.”).
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clarifying which law applies to transnational actors.  However, by pos-
iting that choice-of-law rules do not significantly influence choice-of-
law decisions, and that those decisions are highly unpredictable, the
mess claims suggest that the choice-of-law system is more likely to
hinder than facilitate these compliance processes.
C. Transnational Bargaining
Much the same analysis holds true for transnational bargaining.
As Robert Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser famously put it, people
bargain in the “shadow of the law.”116  Likewise, transnational actors
bargain in the transnational shadow of domestic law.117  Whether and
how this shadow influences bargaining depends largely on choice of
law.  The question is:  In the shadow of which state’s domestic law are
transnational actors bargaining?  In terms of process, relative cer-
tainty about which law a judge will apply can facilitate bargaining.118
Substantively, bargaining outcomes are likely to be different if the
actors expect a judge to apply the law of one state rather than the law
of another.
If the mess claims are correct, there would be little certainty
about applicable law:  Choice-of-law doctrine only marginally influ-
ences judges’ choice-of-law decisions, which are instead driven by
various biases and are highly unpredictable.  Transnational actors
would therefore have difficulty developing clear, mutual expectations
about which law will apply to their relationships in the event of litiga-
tion.  This, in turn, would make it more difficult for transnational
actors to structure relationships and resolve disputes outside of
116 Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:  The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 950–51, 972–73 (1979); see also Martin Shapiro, Courts,
in 5 HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SCIENCE:  GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESSES
321, 329 (Fred I. Greenstein & Nelson W. Polsby eds., 1975) (“[L]egalized bargaining
under the shadow supervision of an available court . . . is not purely mediatory, because the
bargain struck will depend in part on the ‘legal’ strength of the parties, that is, predictions
of how each would fare in court.”).
117 Whytock, supra note 89, pt. II, at 27–44 (arguing that domestic court decisions influ-
ence strategic choices of transnational actors, such as negotiation and forum selection strat-
egies); Christopher Alexander Whytock, Domestic Courts and Global Governance:  The
Politics of Private International Law 22–31 (2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Duke
University), available at http://hdl.handle.net/10161/452 (arguing that “when domestic
courts apply legal rules in transnational litigation, they can affect not only the parties to the
dispute, but also the strategic behavior of other transnational actors”).
118 See WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 92, at 27 (“Increased certainty about the likely
choice of law permits parties to identify the settlement range, in which settlement terms are
mutually beneficial.”); Michaels, supra note 92, at 156 (“Ex-post predictability [of appli-
cable law] enables parties to either settle rationally in the shadow of a defined substantive
law or litigate matters of that substantive law without too much regard to issues of choice
of law.”).
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court.119  The mess claims thus imply that the choice-of-law system
fails to facilitate, and may even hinder, transnational bargaining.
D. The Special Significance of Published Choice-of-Law Decisions
The foregoing discussion explained the global governance impli-
cations of judges’ international choice-of-law decisions, including the
broad effects these decisions can have on global economic welfare,
transnational rule of law, and bargaining among transnational actors.
An important caveat, however, is that these effects are unlikely to be
widespread when choice-of-law decisions are unpublished, because
unpublished decisions generally do not affect transnational actors
beyond the parties to particular lawsuits.120
Assuming that the litigation and bargaining success of transna-
tional actors depends on domestic court decisions, a strategic-choice
perspective suggests that parties’ behavior will be, in part, a function
of their expectations about how courts will make those decisions.121
These expectations in turn depend on available information about
prior domestic court decisions.  Thus, transnational actors must know
119 See Borchers, supra note 60, at 509 (“Because cases settle (at least for economically
rational litigants) when the parties’ assessments of the value of the case converge to within
the expected cost of pursuing the case to judgment, the ever-present wild card of choice of
law may discourage settlement.”); Wiegand, supra note 5, at 4 (stating that lack of predict-
ability in choice of law may discourage settlement because it inhibits accurate case
valuation).
120 Following Siegelman and Donohue, I define “published decisions” as decisions pub-
lished in the Federal Supplement reporter or in the LexisNexis electronic database.  Peter
Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, Studying the Iceberg from Its Tip:  A Comparison of
Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
1133, 1138 (1990).
121 Strategic-choice theory helps explain this relationship between knowledge and
behavior.  Strategic behavior is behavior by one actor based on the anticipated behavior of
other actors.  See David A. Lake & Robert Powell, International Relations:  A Strategic-
Choice Approach, in STRATEGIC CHOICE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 3, 3–6 (David
A. Lake & Robert Powell eds., 1999) (defining strategic-choice approach).  Strategic
behavior occurs when one actor’s ability to further its goals depends on how other actors
behave; under these conditions, each actor’s decisions must take into account the expected
actions of the other actors. See id. (“[International actors’] choices . . . are frequently
strategic; that is, each actor’s ability to further its ends depends on how other actors
behave, and therefore each actor must take the actions of others into account.”). As game
theorist James Morrow explains, “[a]n actor cannot simply choose a course of action that
produces its preferred outcome because the choices of others also affect the final result.”
James D. Morrow, The Strategic Setting of Choices:  Signaling, Commitment, and Negotia-
tion in International Politics, in STRATEGIC CHOICE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
supra.  Since actors generally do not know for sure how others will behave, they typically
infer future behavior from past behavior. See Lake & Powell, supra, at 9 (observing that
without knowing how other party will act, “the [actor] has to base her decision on the
[other party’s] past behavior”).  Thus, strategic behavior is largely a function of available
information, upon which inferences can be made about the future behavior of others.
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about judges’ international choice-of-law decisions in order for those
decisions to have widespread effects on global economic welfare, legal
compliance, and bargaining.  But transnational actors generally do not
have knowledge of unpublished decisions.122  As a result, the content
of those decisions—including the circumstances of the decision and
whether the judge applied domestic or foreign law—is unlikely to
influence their behavior.123
Published international choice-of-law decisions are therefore
especially relevant from a governance-oriented perspective.124  The
fact that most grievances do not lead to disputes and most disputes do
not lead to litigation125 only underscores the importance of focusing
on those decisions—namely, published decisions—that are most likely
to influence the behavior of actors beyond the parties to particular
lawsuits.126  Of course, even if published decisions are of special rele-
vance for understanding global governance and the transnational
shadow of the law, unpublished decisions are also important.127  Nev-
122 See Stephen L. Wasby, Unpublished Court of Appeals Decisions:  A Hard Look at the
Process, 14 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 67, 96 (2004) (noting that unpublished decision “‘is,
more or less, a letter from the court to parties familiar with the facts’ . . . [and] ‘is not
written in a way that will be fully intelligible to those unfamiliar with the case’” (quoting
Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1178 (9th Cir. 2001))); Hillel Y. Levin, Making the Law:
Unpublication in the District Courts, VILL. L. REV.  (forthcoming) (manuscript at 11),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1006101 (“[U]npublished
district court opinions are not meaningfully available for review and study by anyone.”).
123 Arguably, however, non-publication itself may have global governance implications
insofar as it decreases information about how judges are likely to behave in the future and
thus increases uncertainty among transnational actors.
124 This is a core insight of governance-oriented analysis of transnational law. See
Whytock, supra note 89, at 29 (“[P]ublished court decisions are more likely to affect the
strategic behavior of transnational actors than unpublished decisions.”).
125 See Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes:  Assessing
the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 525, 545–46 (1980–1981) (analyzing number
of claims that lead to disputes and litigation).
126 Shapiro writes:
The bulk of conflict resolution through legal channels occurs by negotiation
between the parties and their attorneys under the compulsion of eventual
court proceedings should negotiations fail.  To dismiss the vast bulk of conflict
resolution by law in modern societies as somehow extrajudicial would both
direct the student of courts away from the central phenomenon and lead to
fundamental distortions of reality.  For previously announced judicial rules and
the anticipation by the disputants of the costs and benefits of eventually going
to trial are key parameters in such negotiations.
Shapiro, supra note 116, at 329.
127 From a litigant-oriented perspective, a court’s decision on a choice-of-law issue is
important to the parties disputing that issue whether or not the decision is published. See
Borchers, supra note 60, at 510 (“Real people, after all, are litigants in multistate cases.
We ought to take account of what we . . . are doing [via conflicts rules] to these real
people.”); Levin, supra note 1, at 259–60 (drawing attention to impact of choice of law on
individual lawyers and litigants).  And even from a governance-oriented perspective, court
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ertheless, published choice-of-law decisions are more likely than
unpublished choice-of-law decisions to have broad effects on global
economic welfare, transnational rule-of-law, and bargaining among
transnational actors.  Published international choice-of-law decisions
are therefore particularly relevant for developing an understanding of
the contributions of the choice-of-law system to global governance.
IV
MYTH OF MESS?  EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE REGARDING
INTERNATIONAL CHOICE OF LAW
Do the mess claims accurately describe international choice-of-
law decisionmaking?  Is it true that choice-of-law doctrine does not
significantly affect international choice-of-law decisions and that those
decisions are instead motivated by biases in favor of domestic law,
domestic parties, and plaintiffs?  Are those decisions in fact highly
unpredictable?  The answers clearly matter for choice-of-law scholar-
ship.  “After all,” ask William Richman and William Reynolds, “why
continue to debate the relative merits of competing [choice-of-law]
theories if all produce the same pattern and frequency of results?”128
The answers also matter for litigants, who are directly affected by
judges’ choice-of-law decisions.129  Which state’s law applies can
determine the litigation outcome.130  Most importantly for purposes of
this Article, the answers can shed light on whether choice of law sig-
nificantly affects global governance and, if so, whether its impact is
beneficial or harmful.131
This Part seeks to answer these questions empirically.  First, it
reviews prior empirical studies that have assessed one or more of the
mess claims.  These studies may have underestimated the influence of
choice-of-law doctrine, and they focused on choice of law generally
rather than international choice of law specifically.  In response to
decisions that are not based on “public, prospective laws, with the qualities of generality,
equality of application, and certainty,” TAMANAHA, supra note 109, at 119, are at odds
with core rule-of-law principles and thus undermine transnational rule of law whether or
not they are published.  This Article’s emphasis on published decisions is not intended to
downplay the importance of unpublished decisions.
128 Richman & Reynolds, supra note 55, at 429.
129 See supra note 127 (describing importance of choice of law from litigant-oriented
perspective).
130 Insofar as legal differences are even more pronounced cross-nationally than between
U.S. states, international choice-of-law decisions are particularly likely to affect litigation
outcomes. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 45, at 750 (discussing international case,
Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), where appellate judges’ disagreement
over applicable choice-of-law and substantive rules proved important to result).
131 See supra Part III (arguing that choice-of-law system can have important conse-
quences for global governance).
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1257096
746 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:719
these earlier efforts, this Part proposes an alternative empirical
strategy for evaluating the accuracy of the mess claims as descriptions
of international choice-of-law decisionmaking.  Using statistical anal-
ysis of an original dataset of published international choice-of-law
decisions by U.S. district court judges in tort cases, this Part presents
evidence that choice-of-law doctrine does influence these decisions;
that these decisions are not biased in favor of domestic law, domestic
litigants, or plaintiffs; and that they are in fact quite predictable.  The
evidence suggests that the mess claims may be myths, at least in trans-
national tort litigation.
A. Empirical Priors
This Article is not the first to evaluate empirically the conven-
tional wisdom about choice of law.  Four previous studies are particu-
larly important.132  Taken together, they provide significant, if mixed,
support for the mess claims.  However, as explained below, these prior
studies may overestimate the role of bias and underestimate the influ-
ence of choice-of-law doctrine on judges’ choice-of-law decisions.
Moreover, these prior studies address choice of law generally rather
than international choice of law specifically; this limits their ability to
shed light on the implications of judges’ choice-of-law decisions for
global governance.
1. The Solimine, Borchers, Thiel, and Symeonides Studies
The seminal empirical study in this area is Michael Solimine’s An
Economic and Empirical Analysis of Choice of Law.133  Solimine
noted the frequent criticism that modern choice-of-law methods
exhibit pro-domestic-law, pro-domestic-party, and pro-plaintiff biases,
but observed that “there has been no empirical survey to confirm or
deny these anecdotal accounts.”134  He therefore empirically analyzed
choice-of-law decisions in tort cases in state supreme courts and U.S.
circuit courts between 1970 and 1988.135
Solimine’s findings seemed to indicate that modern methods
favored both domestic law and plaintiffs.  Regarding pro-domestic-law
bias, Solimine found that courts using one of the modern methods—
that is, a method other than the First Restatement—applied domestic
132 See SYMEONIDES, supra note 18; Borchers, supra note 55; Solimine, supra note 15;
Thiel, supra note 11.  Another empirical study focuses on choice-of-law decisions in
Wisconsin.  Wiegand, supra note 5.
133 Solimine, supra note 15.
134 Id. at 50, 81.
135 Id. at 81.
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law more often than not.136  These courts frequently applied domestic
law even when the tort did not occur in the forum state, whereas
courts using the First Restatement rarely did so.137  Regarding pro-
plaintiff bias, he found that courts using one of the modern methods
applied the law favoring plaintiffs more often than not138 and that
these courts did so more frequently than courts using the First
Restatement.139  Thus, Solimine’s findings provided significant sup-
port for the claims that modern choice-of-law methods are biased in
favor of domestic law and in favor of plaintiffs.140
The study’s support for the mess claims was not unequivocal,
however.  Solimine found that the pro-plaintiff bias of the modern
methods was only slightly greater when the plaintiffs were residents of
the forum state than when they were not,141 which would seem to limit
significantly the study’s support for the pro-domestic-party bias
claim.142  Moreover, the differences Solimine observed between the
First Restatement and the modern methods in terms of pro-domestic-
law and pro-plaintiff bias suggest that at least some doctrinal differ-
ences may influence choice-of-law decisions.
The next important study in this area was Patrick Borchers’s The
Choice-of-Law Revolution:  An Empirical Study,143 a groundbreaking
analysis of choice-of-law decisions in tort cases in state and federal
136 State supreme courts and U.S. appellate courts using one of the modern methods
applied domestic law at a rate of 66% and 61%, respectively. Id. at 85 tbls.4 & 5.
137 Courts using one of the modern methods applied domestic law even when the tort
did not occur in the forum state at a rate of 43% (state supreme courts) and 27% (U.S.
appellate courts), whereas courts using the First Restatement did so at a rate of 13% (state
supreme courts) and 7% (U.S. appellate courts). Id.
138 Courts using one of the modern methods applied plaintiff-favoring law at a rate of
63% (state supreme courts) and 51% (U.S. appellate courts). Id. at 83–84 tbls.2 & 3.
139 Courts using the First Restatement applied plaintiff-favoring law at a rate of 45%
(state supreme courts) and 23% (U.S. appellate courts). Id.
140 See id. at 86–88 (interpreting data as confirming pro-domestic-law and pro-plaintiff
hypotheses); id. at 50 (concluding that data “suggest some support for the empirical
assumptions of the critics of modern choice of law theory”).
141 Id. at 89 (“[R]esident plaintiffs are favored under modern choice of law theories . . . .
Plaintiff recovery rates under the modern approach are somewhat more pronounced in
both federal and state courts in this subsample as compared to all the cases.  Perhaps what
is most surprising is that the differences are relatively small.”).  Specifically, the pro-
domestic-plaintiff decision rate for courts using one of the modern methods was 65% for
state supreme courts and 67% for U.S. appellate courts, id. at 88 tbls.6 & 7, compared to an
overall pro-plaintiff rate of 63% for state supreme courts and 51% for U.S. appellate
courts, id. at 83–84 tbls.2 & 3.
142 See id. at 89 (finding “empirical support for the proposition that modern choice of
law theories inevitably tend to hold against defendants in general and out-of-state defen-
dants in particular” but noting that results suggest “courts are not making an extra effort to
permit recoveries against nonresident defendants”).
143 Borchers, supra note 55.
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courts at both the trial and appellate levels from 1960 to 1992.144  Like
Solimine, Borchers distinguished between the First Restatement and
the modern methods145 and found that, compared to the First Restate-
ment, the modern methods more frequently resulted in pro-domestic-
law and pro-plaintiff decisions.146  Borchers also found evidence that
courts using modern methods are more likely to apply the law pre-
ferred by domestic parties than courts using the First Restatement.147
In addition, he found that each of the modern methods he analyzed
resulted in pro-domestic-law, pro-domestic-party, and pro-plaintiff
decisions more often than not in his dataset, though not always with
95% confidence.148
Thus, on the one hand, the Borchers study is consistent with
claims that the modern methods are biased in favor of domestic law,
domestic parties, and plaintiffs, both in absolute terms and when com-
pared to the First Restatement.  On the other hand, this very differ-
ence between outcomes under the modern methods and the First
Restatement suggests that some doctrinal differences may signifi-
cantly influence choice-of-law decisions.
Unlike Solimine, Borchers went beyond comparisons between
the First Restatement and the modern methods, making more fine-
grained distinctions among several of the modern methods them-
selves.  He began by assuming that if differences among the modern
choice-of-law methods mattered, then they “should yield different
patterns of results in tort cases.”149  More specifically, he hypothesized
that relative to the First Restatement, the Leflar method and interest
analysis should be strongly biased, and the Second Restatement
mildly biased, toward domestic law;150 the Leflar method should be
144 Id. at 367–70.
145 Id. at 377.
146 Id.
147 See id. (“The picture is somewhat foggier with respect to the propensity of the
approaches to favor local parties. . . . [But] the First Restatement is probably the least
generous to locals.”).
148 See id. at 374 tbl.III (showing percentages for decisions overall); id. at 375 tbl.IV
(breaking down data by state and federal court).  Among the findings with 95% confidence
are that interest analysis and the Leflar method are both more likely than not to result in
pro-domestic-law and pro-plaintiff outcomes. Id. at 374 tbl.III.
149 Id. at 364.
150 Borchers’s predictions were based on the assumption (which he ultimately found
false) that courts apply these methods faithfully and that the differences between the
methods should therefore lead to different patterns of outcomes. Id.  Because the First
Restatement is neutral on its face, he predicted that this method should not exhibit bias.
Id. at 364–65.  But according to Borchers, the Second Restatement should have a mild pro-
domestic-law bias because two factors in section 6 point toward forum law, and the Leflar
method and interest analysis should have strong pro-domestic-law biases because the
former calls for application of the “better law” (and judges are likely to find that the law of
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strongly biased, and interest analysis and the Second Restatement
mildly biased, in favor of plaintiffs;151 and interest analysis should be
strongly biased, the Leflar method mildly biased, but the Second
Restatement not biased in favor of domestic parties.152
Contrary to these hypotheses—but consistent with the mess claim
that choice-of-law doctrine does not significantly influence choice-of-
law decisionmaking—Borchers found that the different modern
methods generally did not lead to different patterns of outcomes.153
He therefore concluded that “[c]ourts do not take the new approaches
seriously.”154
In Choice of Law and the Home-Court Advantage:  Evidence,155
Stuart Thiel built on the Borchers and Solimine studies.  Thiel applied
multivariate statistical techniques to analyze Borchers’s data on
choice-of-law decisions, and he used variables identified by Solimine
to control for the effect of legal culture on whether particular states
adopt one of the modern methods in the first place.156  With respect to
the mess claims, Thiel’s findings were mixed.  On the one hand, he
concluded that “the data do not support an inference that there is any
difference in pro-resident or pro-recovery tendencies between
[modern-method and First Restatement states]”; but he also con-
cluded that the modern-method states “do seem to prefer forum
law.”157  Moreover, after disaggregating the modern methods, Thiel
found significant differences among them in terms of pro-domestic-
law and pro-plaintiff, but not pro-domestic-party, decision rates.158  In
their forum is “better”) and the latter requires application of forum law “in all cases except
those in which the parties have a common domicile outside the state.” Id. at 365–67.
151 Id. at 364–67.  According to Borchers, this is because the pro-domestic-law biases of
the Second Restatement and interest analysis are likely to lead “plaintiffs to file cases in
states having favorable substantive rules,” and the Leflar method tends to equate the
“better” law with plaintiff-favoring law. Id.
152 Id. at 364–67.  According to Borchers, this is because “[n]one of the factors in either
section 6 or section 145 [of the Second Restatement] make any overt distinctions between
locals and nonlocals.”  By contrast, interest analysis’s “fundamental assumption that laws
are enacted for the benefit of local parties is bound to favor local parties over nonlocals,”
and the Leflar method’s governmental interest factor “must favor locals somewhat, but the
better law determinant should dilute this significantly.” Id.
153 Id. at 377–79.
154 Id. at 379.
155 Thiel, supra note 11.
156 Id. at 303–05.
157 Id. at 310; see also id. at 313 (noting that his findings are “in accord with the estimate
. . . that [modern-method] states are more likely at the margin to apply their own law” than
First Restatement states).  According to Thiel, much of the pro-domestic-law, pro-
domestic-party, and pro-plaintiff biases of courts using modern methods identified by
Borchers may be due to the forum state’s legal culture rather than modern methods them-
selves. Id. at 307.
158 Id. at 312.
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particular, he found that compared to the First Restatement and the
Second Restatement, interest analysis is the most pro–domestic law,
followed by the Leflar method,159 and that the Leflar method is the
most pro-plaintiff, followed by interest analysis.160  For their part,
“Second Restatement states are on average in agreement with the
First Restatement states in any category.”161  Thus, although Thiel
detected some evidence of bias, his findings suggest that prior studies
may have underestimated the influence of some doctrinal differences
and overestimated the extent of bias in choice-of-law decisionmaking.
Most recently, Symeon Symeonides closely examined 100 choice-
of-law decisions by state and federal courts at both the trial and appel-
late levels in product liability cases between 1990 and 2005.162  Based
on his analysis, he concluded that “[d]espite impressions to the con-
trary, courts do not favor plaintiffs as a class; courts do not favor local
over non-local litigants; and courts do not unduly favor the law of the
forum.”163  Although Symeonides concludes that choice-of-law doc-
trine is not an important influence on choice-of-law decisions,164 his
study provides further evidence that choice-of-law decisionmaking
might not be as biased as the conventional wisdom suggests.
Taken together, these earlier empirical studies provide significant,
if mixed, support for the mess claims.  Consistent with the marginal-
influence-of-doctrine claim, Borchers found no significant differences
among the pro-domestic-law, pro-domestic-party, and pro-plaintiff
tendencies of the different modern methods.  Thiel’s study confirmed
the pro-domestic-party bias finding.  On the other hand, Thiel found
significant differences among the modern methods in terms of their
pro-domestic-law and pro-plaintiff tendencies.  Moreover, all three
studies comparing the First Restatement with modern methods found
significant differences between their outcomes, suggesting that at least
some doctrinal differences do influence judges’ choice-of-law
decisions.
Regarding the specific bias claims, three of the four prior studies
(Solimine, Borchers, and Thiel, but not Symeonides) found evidence
that the modern methods were biased in favor of domestic law.  Two
159 See id. at 313 (“Interest Analysis favors forum law, with Leflar being a significant
runner up.”).
160 See id. (“Leflar states are enthusiastic pro-recovery states with Interest Analysis
states a significant runner up.”).
161 Id. at 312.
162 SYMEONIDES, supra note 18, at 273–364.
163 Id. at 338 (emphasis omitted).
164 To the contrary, he argues that “of all the factors that may affect the outcome of a
conflicts case, the factor that is the most inconsequential is the choice-of-law methodology
followed by the court.” Id. at 70 (emphasis omitted).
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out of four (Solimine and Borchers, but not the others) found evi-
dence that the modern methods were biased in favor of domestic par-
ties and plaintiffs.165  However, the Thiel and Symeonides studies both
raised questions about the extent of these biases.  Although several
studies expressed concern about the uncertainties surrounding
modern choice-of-law methods,166 none of them attempted to esti-
mate the predictability of judges’ choice-of-law decisions.
2. Limitations of Prior Studies
These prior studies collectively represent an important step for-
ward in choice-of-law scholarship.167  They provide a valuable comple-
ment to the field’s rich doctrinal and theoretical work by improving
understanding of the real-world consequences of choice-of-law doc-
trine and by basing that understanding on systematic empirical anal-
ysis rather than anecdotes and impressions.168
Nevertheless, these studies have significant limitations.  First,
because they do not control for what different choice-of-law methods
have in common, they may underestimate the effects of doctrinal dif-
ferences on judges’ choice-of-law decisions.  Two common factors in
particular permeate choice-of-law doctrine:  territoriality (the connec-
tions between activity and the territory of a state) and personality (the
legal connections between actors and a state, such as citizenship).169
165 See also Wiegand, supra note 5, at 31–33 (finding that in Wisconsin, modern method-
ologies do not favor domestic parties or plaintiffs).
166 See SYMEONIDES, supra note 18, at 362 (noting “high uncertainties regarding the
final outcome” of choice-of-law decision); Borchers, supra note 55, at 382–83 (concluding
that “[a]ll of the new approaches are extraordinarily malleable” and “usually amount to
little more than long-winded excuses to do what courts wanted to do in the first place,”
which “makes it difficult to advise clients”).
167 See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 55, at 428 (praising Borchers and Solimine
studies as “show[ing] the potential to solve persistent choice-of-law problems” and
“tak[ing] the debate [over whether the modern methods lead to different results] to a new
and more informed level”).
168 O’Hara and Ribstein have noted this tendency in conflicts scholarship:
More empirical studies could help clarify the choice of law debate.  In the con-
flicts field . . . legal academics make bald statements claiming that various
approaches or rules will work in particular ways or have specific effects on
primary behavior.  Those statements are supported at best with slight anec-
dotal evidence.  The field is ripe for empiricists who can cut through the legal
and academic thicket to view the landscape.
O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 68, at 642.
169 See Symeon C. Symeonides, Territoriality and Personality in Tort Conflicts, in INTER-
CONTINENTAL COOPERATION THROUGH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW:  ESSAYS IN
MEMORY OF PETER E. NYGH 401, 402 (Talia Einhorn & Kurt Siehr eds., 2004) (“[T]he
history of [conflict of laws] is a story of clash and tension between two grand operating
principles—territoriality and personality of the laws.  This is particularly true in tort con-
flicts.”). See generally SCOLES ET AL., supra note 13, § 17.83, at 942–45 (tracing history of
territoriality and personality in choice-of-law doctrine).
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Except for the First Restatement’s traditional lex loci delicti method,
which emphasizes a single territorial connection (the place of the
wrong),170 both territoriality and personality are explicitly or implic-
itly relevant factors in each of the choice-of-law methods discussed in
Part I.171  Statistical tests that do not control for these factors fail to
separate out what these methods have in common and therefore risk
being insensitive to their differences.  The lack of controls for this
common emphasis on territoriality and personality may account for
prior empirical findings suggesting that different modern methods do
not lead to significant differences in choice-of-law decisionmaking.172
Second, the analyses of bias (in all but Thiel’s study) were based
only on pro-domestic-law, pro-domestic-party, and pro-plaintiff deci-
sion rates.173  However, factors other than bias may also contribute to
these rates, and case selection effects make them difficult to inter-
pret.174  For example, by looking at pro-domestic-law, pro-domestic-
party, and pro-plaintiff decision rates alone, one cannot tell whether
170 See supra text accompanying notes 19–21 (describing lex loci delicti method).
171 The traditional lex loci delicti method emphasizes a single territorial factor:  the place
of the wrong. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 378–379 (1934)
(stating that “law of the place of wrong” should determine whether plaintiff has sustained
“legal injury” and whether defendant is responsible for harm).  The Second Restatement
instructs courts to consider four factors in tort cases:  place of injury, place of conduct,
nationality of the parties, and place of the parties’ relationship. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971).  All four are factors of territoriality or per-
sonality.  In addition, for specific types of torts, including personal injuries, the Second
Restatement presumes that the “law of the state where the injury occurred” should apply.
Id. §§ 146–148; see also Solimine, supra note 15, at 55 (“[T]he Second Restatement[ ] con-
tains a heavy dose of territorial views.”).  Judges following the significant contacts
approach usually consider the same four factors listed in the Second Restatement. SCOLES
ET AL., supra note 13, at 98.  The Lauritzen method also includes territoriality and person-
ality. See supra text accompanying notes 46–47.  Territoriality and personality are implicit
in interest analysis and the Leflar method (in which one factor is advancement of the
forum’s governmental interest), because the extent of a government’s interest is largely a
function of its territorial connections to the underlying activity and the nationality of the
parties. See SYMEONIDES, supra note 18, at 15 (noting Currie’s definition of governmental
interest as depending on relationship between state and transaction, parties, or litigation).
The factors are even implicit in the lex fori method, according to which governmental
interests determine whether the forum law presumption can be overcome. See
SYMEONIDES, supra note 18, at 76–81 (surveying states following lex fori method and
explaining circumstances in which forum law presumption can be rebutted, all of which
depend on “significant contacts” or government interests).
172 See supra text accompanying notes 60–67 (discussing mess claim that modern
methods all lead to substantially similar outcomes).
173 These decision rates reflect the frequency with which courts apply domestic law, rule
in favor of domestic parties, and rule in favor of plaintiffs, respectively.
174 See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L.
REV. 119, 137–40 (2002) (explaining case-selection effects, i.e., effects of parties’ choices
about which disputes to litigate and which disputes not to litigate, and consequences for
interpreting judicial decision rates).
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high rates are due to bias (as the mess claims imply) or simply due to
the frequency of particular pro-domestic-law, pro-domestic-party, or
pro-plaintiff decisions based on good faith application of the appro-
priate choice-of-law rule to the facts of the case.  The latter explana-
tion suggests that even very high pro-domestic-law, pro-domestic-
party, and pro-plaintiff decision rates do not necessarily imply bias but
may instead be a function of the legal merits of the parties’ arguments
as assessed by unbiased judges.  To mitigate the interpretive problems
posed by case-selection effects, it is important to isolate this case-
strength factor;175 none of the prior empirical studies attempted to do
so.
Third, the prior studies do not statistically analyze the predict-
ability of judges’ choice-of-law decisions.  Therefore, notwithstanding
the mess claim that judges’ choice-of-law decisions are highly unpre-
dictable,176 it remains to be seen just how unpredictable those deci-
sions are.
Finally, the prior studies may not accurately reflect international
choice-of-law decisionmaking, thus limiting their relevance to global
governance.  The prior studies are based on analysis of choice-of-law
decisions in general and do not distinguish between domestic and
international decisions.  Because the former are much more common
than the latter,177 interstate choice-of-law decisions probably influ-
enced the prior studies’ results disproportionately.  And if, as some
argue, transnational litigation is fundamentally different from
domestic litigation,178 this disproportionate influence may render the
findings inapplicable to international choice-of-law decisions.
B. Empirical Strategy
My study builds on these prior empirical analyses of choice-of-
law decisionmaking, but it uses a different empirical strategy to
address their limitations.179  It increases sensitivity to doctrinal differ-
175 Id. at 140 (explaining importance of controlling for case-strength factor when inter-
preting decision rates).
176 See supra Part II.C.
177 See SYMEONIDES, supra note 18, at 5 (noting horizontal interstate conflicts far out-
number international conflicts).
178 See generally Samuel P. Baumgartner, Is Transnational Litigation Different?, 25 U.
PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1297 (2004) (arguing that transnational litigation should be treated as
distinct field).
179 Editors’ Note:  In reviewing this Article for publication, the New York University
Law Review also reviewed the author’s data.  To do so, the Review collected a dataset by
recoding the cases that the author had sampled, reran his models, and tested the results
against the author’s.  Although the Review’s results were not identical to the author’s, the
differentiation was neither noteworthy in magnitude nor statistically significant and was
due entirely to a number of judgment calls on close issues in the coding process.
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ences by taking into account what different choice-of-law methods
have in common, and it mitigates case-selection effects by controlling
for the legal merits of parties’ choice-of-law arguments.  It also
attempts to estimate the predictability of judges’ choice-of-law deci-
sions.  Finally, it focuses specifically on international choice of law.
1. Sample
My goal is to shed empirical light on the global governance impli-
cations of choice-of-law doctrine and choice-of-law decisionmaking.180
To that end, my analysis focuses on published international choice-of-
law decisions.  Published court decisions—decisions which appear
either in official reporters or in widely available electronic databases
such as Lexis and Westlaw181—are more likely than unpublished deci-
sions to be known to transnational actors beyond the parties to partic-
ular lawsuits.182  As discussed above, this means published decisions
are more likely to have broad global governance effects than unpub-
lished decisions.183  Likewise, international choice-of-law decisions are
more likely to affect global governance than domestic choice-of-law
decisions.  Because of its connections to multiple nation-states, trans-
national activity frequently poses questions about which nation-state’s
law should govern that activity.  Courts help answer these questions
when they make international choice-of-law decisions, creating a body
of case law that parties can refer to moving forward.184  For these rea-
sons, published international choice-of-law decisions are my primary
population of interest.185
I therefore created a dataset consisting of a random sample of
published international choice-of-law decisions made by U.S. district
180 See supra Part III (noting that choice-of-law doctrine can affect global governance to
extent that doctrine actually influences judicial decisionmaking).
181 This definition of “published decisions” follows Siegelman and Donohue. See supra
note 120.
182 See supra Part III.D.
183 See supra Part III.D.
184 See supra notes 121–22 and accompanying text.
185 This is not to say that unpublished and domestic choice-of-law decisions are irrele-
vant to global governance.  As noted above, whether or not a judge’s choice-of-law deci-
sion in a transnational tort case conforms to core rule-of-law values is normatively
important regardless of whether that decision is published. See supra notes 123, 127.  Simi-
larly, one can certainly imagine transnational disputes in which the choice-of-law issue is
not whether U.S. or foreign law applies, but rather whether the law of one U.S. state or
another U.S. state applies.  Nevertheless, given the special relevance of published decisions
to this Article’s focus on global governance—combined with the impracticability of
obtaining a random sample of unpublished choice-of-law decisions—this study focuses on
published international choice-of-law decisions.
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court judges in tort cases between 1990 and 2005.186  I generated this
sample in three steps.  First, I searched the LexisNexis U.S. District
Court database for decisions in the indicated time period in which a
judge decided whether domestic law or foreign law should apply to a
tort claim.187  Second, I consolidated the results of these searches and
randomly sorted them.  Third, I analyzed each case in the randomly
generated order, discarding those that did not actually decide whether
domestic or foreign law should apply to a tort claim, until my sample
included approximately 200 decisions.188
Eighty-five of these choice-of-law decisions were made in the
context of decisions on motions to dismiss transnational litigation on
forum non conveniens grounds.  One of the factors to be considered
by a judge when deciding whether to grant a forum non conveniens
186 The 1990–2005 time period follows Symeonides. See SYMEONIDES, supra note 18, at
266.  My focus on tort claims also follows prior empirical studies of choice of law. See, e.g.,
id.; Borchers, supra note 55, at 369; Solimine, supra note 15, at 81; Thiel, supra note 11, at
303.  Tort cases are particularly interesting from a choice-of-law perspective because tort
litigation was the “principal battlefield” of the so-called “choice-of-law revolution”—in
which traditional choice-of-law rules were discarded in favor of more flexible modern
approaches—and the new approaches “have their principal application in tort cases.”
Borchers, supra note 55, at 369.  Thus, tort cases “are an excellent vehicle for re-examining
the methodological . . . foundations of American choice of law in general.” SYMEONIDES,
supra note 18, at 2.  Moreover, my focus on tort cases facilitates comparison of my findings
with those of prior studies and serves the interest of cumulative scholarship.  Because state
courts (in general) and federal appellate courts (in non-diversity cases) both make choice-
of-law decisions and play leading roles in developing choice-of-law doctrine, there is a risk
of endogeneity.  By focusing on federal district court decisions, I reduce this risk, at least
with respect to state choice-of-law doctrine.  To reduce the risk of selection bias, I used
random sampling to generate my sample. See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of
Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 110 (2002) (explaining how random sampling avoids selec-
tion bias).
187 Domestic law includes both U.S. federal law and the law of a U.S. state.  Foreign law
includes the law of a foreign state (e.g., Canada) and the law of a political subdivision
thereof (e.g., British Columbia).
I used the following query:  “([COUNTRY SEARCH TERM] w/3 law) w/200 ((choice
or conflict or appli! or govern!) w/2 law) and tort!”  I used the first element of the query to
identify cases involving foreign law; I repeated the search for each country in the world,
inserting appropriate country search terms into the query.  I used the second element of
the query to limit the search to choice-of-law decisions.  The third element limited the
search to tort cases.  It is unlikely that search results would be significantly different using
Westlaw. See Brian N. Lizotte, Publish or Perish:  The Electronic Availability of Summary
Judgments by Eight District Courts, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 107, 134 (2007) (finding Lexis and
Westlaw highly consistent in cases they report).
188 The exact number of decisions in my sample is 213.  Discarded cases include:  cases
referring to a foreign state but not involving a choice between domestic and foreign law;
decisions identifying, but not deciding, choice-of-law issues; and cases referring to tort law
but not deciding a choice-of-tort-law issue.  I also discarded duplicate cases. See Barbara
Koremenos, Contracting Around International Uncertainty, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 549, 554
(2005) (applying similar screening approach to create random sample of international trea-
ties for statistical analysis).  I conducted all screening.
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dismissal is whether domestic or foreign law is likely to apply;
domestic law weighs in favor of denying the motion and foreign law in
favor of granting it.189  In principle, choice-of-law decisions in the
forum non conveniens context should be made in the same way as
choice-of-law decisions outside that context.190  Therefore, I did not
exclude these decisions from my overall dataset.
In practice, however, there is likely to be at least one significant
difference between these two contexts.  Because foreign law weighs in
favor of granting forum non conveniens motions, decisions that for-
eign law should apply are more likely to appear in opinions granting
forum non conveniens motions than in opinions denying them.191
Moreover, U.S. district court judges include a choice-of-law analysis in
only about half of their forum non conveniens opinions, and they are
more likely to do so when they grant forum non conveniens motions
than when they deny them.192  Thus, a disproportionately high
number of choice-of-law decisions on forum non conveniens motions
are likely to hold that foreign law should apply.193  To check whether
any of my findings are affected by the inclusion of these decisions, I
performed each statistical analysis twice, once with and once without
forum non conveniens cases.  Except for pro-domestic-law decision
rates, inclusion of the forum non conveniens cases generally did not
affect my basic findings.194  I report any significant differences below.
2. Dependent Variable
The mess claims are about judges’ choice-of-law decisions and the
factors that explain (or fail to explain) them.  Therefore, the depen-
189 See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508–09 (1947) (listing factors to be con-
sidered by courts in forum non conveniens analysis).
190 See Martin Davies, Time To Change the Federal Forum Non Conveniens Analysis, 77
TUL. L. REV. 309, 356 (2002) (arguing that proper consideration of need-to-apply-foreign-
law factor in forum non conveniens decision requires choice-of-law analysis).
191 See Memorandum from Christopher A. Whytock to the New York University Law
Review (Feb. 13, 2009) (on file with the New York University Law Review) (describing
data, variables, and analysis used and providing code for Stata statistical software and
output predicting likelihood that decisions applying foreign law will appear in opinions
granting or denying forum non conveniens).  This unpublished study found that decisions
that foreign law should apply appear in an estimated 64.6% [54.8, 73.4] of opinions
granting forum non conveniens motions, but in only an estimated 14.4% [9.0, 22.2] of opin-
ions denying them. Id. Figures in brackets are the lower and upper bounds of the esti-
mate’s 95% confidence interval.
192 See id. (finding that U.S. district court judges include choice-of-law analysis in esti-
mated 66.7% [57.0, 75.2] of opinions granting forum non conveniens motions, but in only
28.8% [21.2, 37.9] of opinions denying them).
193 See id. (finding that estimated 82.5% [73.6, 88.9] of choice-of-law decisions in forum
non conveniens opinions are decisions that foreign law should apply).
194 See infra Part IV.C.
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dent variable in my statistical analyses—the variable to be
explained—is whether the judge decided that domestic law, rather
than foreign law, should apply.  I labeled this variable “Domestic
Law,” and coded it as “Yes” (1) if the judge decided that domestic law
should apply and “No” (0) if the judge decided that foreign law should
apply.195
3. Explanatory Variables
The mess claims posit various factors that purportedly influence
(or fail to influence) choice-of-law decisionmaking.  To test these
claims, I created a series of explanatory variables that correspond to
those factors and used statistical methods to estimate their effects on
the probability that a judge will decide in favor of domestic rather
than foreign law.
a. Choice-of-Law Doctrine
To test the marginal-influence-of-doctrine claim, I created the
variable “Second Restatement” and coded it as “Yes” (1) if the appli-
cable choice-of-law method was the Second Restatement—the most
widely adopted choice-of-law method196—and “No” (0) if otherwise.
If, as the mess claims suggest, choice-of-law doctrine does not signifi-
cantly influence choice-of-law decisionmaking, then the Second
Restatement variable should not significantly affect the probability
that a judge will apply domestic law.
This should be a relatively easy test for the marginal-influence-of-
doctrine claim to pass, since choice-of-law scholarship suggests that
the Second Restatement is especially unlikely to have a significant
influence on choice-of-law decisionmaking.197  According to Sterk, the
195 All coding was done by the author.  Note that some lawsuits raise multiple choice-of-
law issues.  This can occur when there are multiple legal claims involving different
substantive areas of law to which different choice-of-law methods apply (e.g., a plaintiff in
transnational litigation may assert both contract and tort claims against the defendant, in
which case the judge may need to engage in two separate choice-of-law analyses).  This can
also occur when the laws of different states apply to different substantive issues in a single
cause of action, an approach known as depeçage. SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, WENDY
COLLINS PERDUE & ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN, CONFLICT OF LAWS:  AMERICAN, COMPAR-
ATIVE, INTERNATIONAL 259 (2d ed. 2003).  For each case in my sample that includes more
than one international choice-of-law decision, my coding was based on the first such deci-
sion that appears in the court’s opinion.
196 As of 2006, 44% of U.S. states had adopted the Second Restatement for tort cases.
See supra Table 1.
197 See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 66, at 466 (arguing that Second Restatement’s “undi-
rected, multifactor analysis invites post-hoc rationalizing of intuitions about the applicable
law”); Levin, supra note 1, at 251 (referring to Second Restatement as “a fairly meaning-
less mixture” of various approaches); Roosevelt, supra note 1, at 2449, 2466 (calling
Second Restatement “hopelessly underdeterminative” and “an indigestible stew” that
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Second Restatement is “perhaps the most malleable of choice of law
approaches.”198  Borchers asserts that “citation to the Second Restate-
ment is often little more than a veil hiding judicial intuition.”199  And
Gottesman characterizes the Second Restatement as “a cacophonous
formula of formulae, a blend of indeterminate indeterminacy.  A total
disaster in practice, as all [choice-of-law scholars] now acknowl-
edge.”200  From this perspective, it would be unsurprising if the
Second Restatement does not significantly affect choice-of-law deci-
sionmaking and surprising if it does.
On the other hand, if choice-of-law doctrine matters, then the
probability that a judge will apply domestic rather than foreign law
should depend significantly on whether the applicable choice-of-law
method is the Second Restatement.201  In particular, a doctrinal per-
spective suggests that the Second Restatement should have a negative
effect on the likelihood of a judge applying domestic law.202  The
“lists a dizzying number of factors with no hint as to their relative weight”); Weinberg,
supra note 71, at 1645 (arguing that Second Restatement has led to “a predictably large
quotient of arbitrary and unjust results”).
198 Sterk, supra note 2, at 951.
199 Patrick J. Borchers, Courts and the Second Conflicts Restatement:  Some Observa-
tions and an Empirical Note, 56 MD. L. REV. 1232, 1233 (1997).
200 Gottesman, supra note 65, at 527.
201 See Borchers, supra note 55, at 364 (arguing that if judges take choice-of-law doc-
trine seriously, “different approaches should yield different patterns of results in tort
cases”).
202 Compared to the First Restatement in particular, rather than other methods in gen-
eral, it is less clear from a doctrinal perspective whether the Second Restatement should
have a negative effect on the probability of a pro-domestic-law decision.  Both Restate-
ments have presumptions in favor of the law of the place of injury. RESTATEMENT (FIRST)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 378–379 (1934); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§§ 146–148 (1971).  Both also include “escape devices” that judges can use to avoid
applying the law of the place of injury.  Under the First Restatement, judges can apply
forum law rather than foreign law by “re-characterizing” a substantive issue as a proce-
dural issue. SCOLES ET AL., supra note 13, §§ 3.3–.4, at 122–25.  Characterizing a claim as
sounding in contract (calling for application of the law of the place of contract) rather than
tort (calling for application of the law of the place of injury) might allow for this as well,
depending on the factual context. Id.  Additionally, courts can refuse to apply foreign law
based on “public policy” considerations. Id. § 3.15, at 143.  Under the Second Restate-
ment, judges can avoid the law of a foreign place of injury by finding that the forum state
has the more significant relationship to the occurrence and parties. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 146–148 (1971).  Which of the two Restatement
methods is more doctrinally “biased” would seem to depend largely on how easily, on
average, judges can make convincing legal arguments that an applicable escape device
applies.  Borchers hypothesized that the Second Restatement would have a mild pro-
domestic-law bias relative to the First Restatement, but his empirical findings on this point
were mixed:  The overall pro-domestic-law decision rate for the First Restatement was
lower than for the Second Restatement, but in federal courts the difference was not statisti-
cally significant (48% +/– 12% for the First Restatement, 55% +/– 7 for the Second
Restatement, using a 95% confidence interval).  Borchers, supra note 55, at 374 tbl.III, 375
tbl.IV.  For his part, Thiel found that “Second Restatement states are on average in agree-
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Second Restatement’s presumptive rules in favor of the law of the
state where the injury occurred should help restrain any judicial bias
in favor of domestic law.203  Moreover, the Second Restatement was
“drafted from the perspective of a neutral forum.”204  It calls on courts
to consider not only the relevant policies of the forum state but also
“the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative inter-
ests of those states in the determination of the particular issue.”205  In
addition, it looks to “the needs of the interstate and international sys-
tems” and the objectives of “certainty, predictability, and uniformity
of result.”206  As the official comments to the Second Restatement
indicate, these factors matter because “[p]robably the most important
function of choice-of-law rules is to make the interstate and interna-
tional systems work well. . . .  [They] should seek to further harmo-
nious relations between states and to facilitate commercial intercourse
between them.”207  Thus faithful application of the Second Restate-
ment should reduce the effect of pro-domestic-law bias and, compared
to other modern methods, increase the likelihood that foreign law will
apply.
The problem is that the Second Restatement variable alone is
likely to underestimate the impact of choice-of-law doctrine on
choice-of-law decisionmaking.  As explained above, two factors per-
meate choice-of-law doctrine:  territoriality and personality.208  Statis-
tical tests that fail to control for these factors fail to separate out what
these methods have in common and thus risk being insensitive to their
differences.209
ment with the First Restatement states” in terms of their pro-domestic-law tendencies.
Thiel, supra note 11, at 312.
203 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 146–148 (1971) (estab-
lishing presumption that law of state where injury occurred applies).  However, this pre-
sumption can be rebutted by a finding that the forum state has “the most significant
relationship” to the occurrence and the parties. Id. § 145(1).  If not applied objectively, the
“most significant relationship” test could allow bias to reenter the decisionmaking process.
Even though Borchers’s findings did not reveal statistically significant differences among
the modern methods in terms of pro-domestic-law tendencies, he did note that “the Second
Restatement shares many of the neutral features of the First Restatement.  By making
territorial connecting factors the thrust of its approach in tort cases, the Second Restate-
ment should be expected to be partially immune to preferences for [domestic law].”
Borchers, supra note 55, at 365 (citation omitted).
204 SCOLES ET AL., supra note 13, § 2.14, at 60.
205 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2) (1971).
206 Id.
207 Id. § 6 cmt. d.
208 See supra Part IV.A.2 (discussing territoriality and personality as factors in choice-
of-law doctrine).
209 This is one limitation of the prior empirical studies discussed in Part IV.A.2, supra.
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Therefore, in addition to Second Restatement, I created variables
to control for territoriality and personality.  To measure territoriality,
I created the variable “Activity Mostly/All Outside U.S. Territory” and
coded it based on two factors:  the place of the defendant’s conduct
and the place of the plaintiff’s alleged injury, each as stated in the
judge’s opinion.  I coded this variable as “Yes” (1) if the place of con-
duct was entirely outside U.S. territory and the place of injury was
partly inside and partly outside U.S. territory; if the place of injury
was entirely outside U.S. territory and the place of conduct partly
inside and partly outside U.S. territory; or if both the place of conduct
and the place of injury were entirely outside U.S. territory.210  Other-
wise, I coded the variable as “No” (0).211  Second, I created the vari-
able “Parties Mostly/All Foreign” and coded it as “Yes” (1) if all
plaintiffs and all defendants were foreign; if all plaintiffs were foreign
and the defendants were mixed; or if all defendants were foreign and
the plaintiffs were mixed.  Otherwise, I coded this variable as “No”
(0).212
In addition to controlling for what the Second Restatement has in
common with other methods, the territoriality and personality vari-
ables provide further indicators of doctrinal effects.  Insofar as territo-
riality and personality are doctrinally relevant to judges’ choice-of-law
decisions, the hypothesis that choice-of-law doctrine influences
choice-of-law decisionmaking implies that Activity Mostly/All Foreign
and Parties Mostly/All Foreign should have negative effects on
Domestic Law.  In other words, a judge should be less likely to apply
domestic law when the underlying activity occurred mostly or entirely
outside U.S. territory or the parties are mostly or all foreign.213  In
contrast, the marginal-relevance-of-doctrine claim implies that these
variables should not significantly influence the probability that a judge
210 I coded the variable based on the territorial connections indicated in the judge’s
opinion.  By basing this measurement on separate place-of-conduct and place-of-injury ele-
ments, and by including a category for “mixed” activity for both of these elements, this
approach accounts for the fact that activity frequently cannot be categorized as purely
inside or outside U.S. territory.  In a different statistical study, I found no evidence of
biased judicial statements of territorial contacts. See Whytock, supra note 117, at 220–22
(testing for bias in judicial statements of fact using same dataset).
211 Thus, Activity Mostly/All Outside U.S. Territory is “No” (0) when the place of con-
duct and place of injury were both mixed or when either the place of conduct or the place
of injury was entirely inside U.S. territory.
212 I coded the variable based on the citizenship of the parties indicated in the judge’s
opinion or, in the absence of citizenship information, based on residence, domicile, or juris-
diction of incorporation.
213 One might interpret the effects of territoriality and personality as indirect doctrinal
effects that exert themselves through judges’ use of “judicial heuristics.”  Whytock, supra
note 117, at 68–77, 180–88.
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will decide in favor of domestic law.  By controlling for territoriality
and personality, the analysis should provide a more accurate estimate
of doctrinal effects than studies that do not control for these factors.
b. Pro-Domestic-Party Bias
To test the pro-domestic-party bias claim, I created the variable
“U.S. Party Prefers Domestic Law.”  I coded it as “Yes” (1) if there
was a U.S. party on one side of the litigation and a non-U.S. party on
the other and the U.S. party preferred domestic law; otherwise, I
coded it as “No” (0).214  If judges are biased in favor of domestic par-
ties, as the mess claims suggest, then this variable should have a posi-
tive effect on Domestic Law.  This would indicate that, other things
being equal, if the domestic party and foreign party disagree on appli-
cable law, the probability that a judge will apply domestic law is
higher when the domestic party prefers domestic law than otherwise.
Following the same logic, I created the variable “U.S. Party Prefers
Foreign Law,” which, if the mess claims are correct, should have a
negative effect on Domestic Law.
c. Pro-Plaintiff Bias
To test the pro-plaintiff (or “pro-recovery”) bias claim, I created
the variable “Plaintiff Prefers Domestic Law.”  I coded it as “Yes” (1)
if the plaintiff preferred domestic law and “No” (0) otherwise.215  If
judges are biased in favor of plaintiffs or recovery, then this variable
should have a positive effect on Domestic Law, indicating that other
things being equal, the probability that a judge will apply domestic law
is higher when the plaintiff prefers domestic law than otherwise.
214 If there were U.S. parties on both sides, I coded U.S. Party Prefers Domestic Law as
“No” (0), on the assumption that conflicting domestic party preferences cancel each other
out and that such instances, in any event, do not indicate whether the domestic party’s
preference is being favored over a foreign party’s preference.  Assuming a U.S. party on
one and only one side of the litigation, I coded the variable as “Yes” (1) if the U.S. party
explicitly argued in favor of domestic law.  In the case of a forum non conveniens decision
in which the U.S. party did not explicitly argue in favor of domestic or foreign law, I coded
“Yes” (1) if the U.S. party was the plaintiff (since domestic law weighs against dismissal)
and “No” (0) if the U.S. party was the defendant (for the same reason).  Whether a party is
a U.S. party or a non-U.S. party is based on the citizenship of the parties indicated in the
court’s opinion or, in the absence of citizenship information, on residence, domicile, or
jurisdiction of incorporation.
215 I coded the variable as “Yes” (1) if the plaintiff explicitly argued in favor of domestic
law.  In forum non conveniens cases, I also coded “Yes” (1) if the plaintiff did not explicitly
argue in favor of domestic or foreign law (since domestic law weighs against dismissal).
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4. Control Variables
There are theoretical reasons to expect that at least three other
factors may influence international choice-of-law decisionmaking; I
created additional variables to control for these factors.216  First, it
takes more time for a judge to understand and apply foreign law than
more familiar domestic law.217  Therefore, other things being equal,
judges with heavier caseloads might be more likely to apply domestic
law.  To control for this factor, I created the variable “Caseload,”
using the “weighted filings” figure from the Federal Court Manage-
ment Statistics maintained by the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts.218  If this caseload hypothesis is correct, Caseload should have
a positive effect on Domestic Law, indicating that other things being
equal, the busier a judge, the higher the probability that she will apply
domestic rather than foreign law.
Second, according to liberal international law theory, “courts of
liberal states handle cases involving other liberal states differently
from the way they handle cases involving nonliberal states.”219  This
theory suggests that the probability that a U.S. judge will apply a for-
eign nation-state’s law depends at least in part on whether the foreign
nation-state is a liberal democracy.  To test this hypothesis, I created
the variable “‘Free’ Foreign State.”  I coded it as “Yes” (1) if the for-
216 Thiel argues that empirical studies of choice-of-law decisionmaking should also con-
trol for state-by-state differences in legal culture (such as levels of innovation and lawyers
per capita) that may (1) cause states to adopt a modern method in place of the traditional
lex loci delicti method and (2) influence judges’ choice-of-law decisions.  Thiel, supra note
11, at 303–04.  I do not attempt to control for such factors in my analysis.  With regard to
Thiel’s first suggested effect, my results do not change when I drop lex loci delicti states
from my dataset; this suggests that omitting these legal cultural factors might not be
affecting my findings.  Regarding Thiel’s second suggested effect, however, his finding that
adding such controls increases the statistical significance of the effects of different choice-
of-law methods on choice-of-law decisionmaking suggests that by not including them, my
analysis may underestimate the impact of choice-of-law doctrine.  Additionally, if there are
more discrete legal-cultural factors that both systematically influence judges’ choice-of-law
decisions and are correlated with the Second Restatement in particular, there is a risk that
my analysis may either overestimate or underestimate the impact of that method,
depending on the direction of that influence.
217 See O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 68, at 634 (describing “efficiency advantages” of
forum law over foreign law); Thiel, supra note 11, at 301 (“There is a powerful efficiency
argument to favor forum law:  it is the law in which the judges are expert.”).
218 See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Fed. Court Mgmt. Statistics, Judicial
Caseload Profile Reports (1997–2008), http://www.uscourts.gov/fcmstat  (follow “District
Courts” hyperlinks; then select District Court and click “Generate” button).  I used a one-
year lag because, due to the typical duration of cases, the prior year’s filings are likely to be
a more accurate measure of the district’s current workload.
219 Anne-Marie Burley, Law Among Liberal States:  Liberal Internationalism and the
Act of State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1907, 1917 (1992).  This hypothesis builds on
liberal international relations theory.
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eign nation-state was rated “Free” by the Freedom House Freedom in
the World report (a leading annual survey of national levels of democ-
racy) and “No” (0) otherwise.220  If the liberal international law
hypothesis is correct, “Free” Foreign State should have a statistically
significant effect on Domestic Law.
Finally, according to the “attitudinal model,” the most important
factor influencing a judge’s decision is the judge’s ideological atti-
tude.221  The attitudinal model implies that the probability that a
judge will apply domestic rather than foreign law depends at least in
part on whether the judge is conservative or liberal.  As two of the
theory’s proponents put it, “Rehnquist votes the way he does because
he is extremely conservative; Marshall voted the way he did because
he was extremely liberal.”222  A common measure of judges’ ideolog-
ical attitudes is the political party—Democrat or Republican—of the
judge’s appointing president.223  Accordingly, I created the variable
“Judge Nominated by Republican,” and coded it as “Yes” (1) if the
judge was nominated by a Republican president and “No” (0) if the
judge was nominated by a Democratic president.  If Judge Nominated
by Republican has a statistically significant and substantively strong
effect on Domestic Law, this would support the attitudinal model
hypothesis.224
Neither the mess claims nor choice-of-law doctrine suggests that
these factors should influence international choice-of-law decision-
making.  Nevertheless, if these variables have more impact than the
Second Restatement, Activity Mostly/All Outside U.S. Territory, and
220 FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2006 (2006), available at http://
www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=278&year=2006.  I used a one-year lag
because judges are unlikely to become immediately aware of changes in a foreign state’s
politics.
221 One leading statement of the attitudinal model has noted that “[t]he attitudinal
model represents a melding together of key concepts from legal realism, political science,
psychology, and economics.  This model holds that the Supreme Court decides disputes in
light of the facts of the case vis-à-vis the ideological attitudes and values of the justices.”
JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL
MODEL REVISITED 86 (2002) (citation omitted).
222 Id.
223 See Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision
Making, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 323, 328 (1992) (using party of nominating president as
proxy for ideological attitudes); see also Tracey E. George, Developing a Positive Theory of
Decisionmaking on U.S. Courts of Appeals, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1635, 1650–55 (1998)
(defending this approach and introducing alternatives).
224 However, tests using the party of the nominating president as a proxy for a judge’s
ideological attitudes may underestimate the impact of those attitudes.  Joshua B. Fischman
& David S. Law, What is Judicial Ideology, and How Should We Measure It?, 29 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 25), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1121228.  Therefore, such tests are “best interpreted as providing only a lower
bound on ideology.” Id.
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Parties Mostly/All Foreign variables, then that finding would seem to
resonate with the general tenor of the mess claims—namely, that fac-
tors other than legal doctrine are driving choice-of-law
decisionmaking.
C. Findings
This section presents my findings.  Table 2 shows actual pro-
domestic-law decision rates, and Table 3 compares these actual rates
with hypothesized merits-based decision rates.  Table 4 compares the
estimated actual effect of each explanatory variable with the effect
posited by the mess claims.  Finally, Table 5 compares the Second
Restatement’s pro-domestic-law decision rates with those of other
choice-of-law methods.
The findings suggest that choice-of-law doctrine does influence
judges’ international choice-of-law decisions in tort cases; that these
decisions are not biased in favor of domestic law, domestic parties,
and plaintiffs; and that these decisions are quite predictable.  These
results suggest that the mess claims do not accurately describe interna-
tional choice-of-law decisionmaking in tort cases.  They also suggest
that choice-of-law doctrine—and the judges that apply it—may make
more productive contributions to global governance than conven-
tional wisdom implies.
1. Little or No Pro-Domestic-Law Bias
First, the evidence suggests that U.S. district court judges are not
biased in favor of domestic law, or that if they are, the bias is not
strong.  As Table 2 indicates, U.S. district court judges decide that
domestic law should apply at an estimated rate of only 37.1%.  There
is 95% confidence that the actual pro-domestic-law decision rate in
the overall population of international choice-of-law decisions by U.S.
district court judges in published tort cases is between 30.9% and
43.8% (hereinafter, I include this 95% confidence interval in brackets
following each estimate, using the following notation:  37.1% [30.9,
43.8]).225
As expected,226 the pro-domestic-law decision rate is particularly
low in the forum non conveniens context (an estimated 9.4% [4.6,
225 This convention follows Epstein’s approach. See Epstein & King, supra note 186, at
49–54 (asserting importance of including indicators of uncertainty); Lee Epstein, Andrew
D. Martin & Matthew M. Schneider, On the Effective Communication of the Results of
Empirical Studies (pt. 1), 59 VAND. L. REV. 1811, 1827–38 (2006) (arguing for better inte-
gration of substance and statistics and proposing this reporting model).
226 See supra Part IV.B.1 (discussing study’s methodology and inclusion of forum non
conveniens cases).
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TABLE 2
INTERNATIONAL CHOICE-OF-LAW DECISIONS BY U.S. DISTRICT
COURT JUDGES IN PUBLISHED TORT CASES
Forum Non Outside Forum
Overall Conveniens Non Conveniens
Context Context
Domestic Law 79 8 71
37.1% 9.4% 55.5%
[30.9, 43.8] [4.6, 17.7] [46.8, 63.8]
Foreign Law 134 77 57
62.9% 90.6% 44.5%
[56.2, 69.1] [82.3, 95.4] [36.2, 53.2]
Total 213 85 128
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
NOTES:  This table shows the number and percentage of cases in my international choice-
of-law dataset in which judges decided that domestic law should apply and in which judges
decided that foreign law should apply.  The percentages provide estimates of pro-domestic-
law and pro-foreign-law decision rates (i.e., the respective rates at which U.S. district court
judges decide in favor of domestic and foreign law) in the overall population of
international choice-of-law decisions in published tort cases.  The figures in brackets are
the lower and upper bounds of each estimate’s 95% confidence interval.
17.7]), which lowers the overall pro-domestic-law rate.  But even
outside the forum non conveniens context, U.S. district court judges
decide that domestic law should apply at an estimated rate of only
55.5%, a figure that does not indicate strong bias.  Moreover, the esti-
mate’s 95% confidence interval ([46.8, 63.8]) indicates that one cannot
be 95% confident that the actual pro-domestic-law decision rate
outside the forum non conveniens context is in fact greater than 50%.
The decision rates in Table 2 therefore suggest that international
choice-of-law decisions are not biased in favor of domestic law.
Due to potential case-selection effects,227 however, pro-domestic-
law decision rates cannot conclusively demonstrate lack of bias.  For
example, differences in the relative merits of litigants’ cases could
complicate interpretation of these rates.  If, in the aggregate, the
merits of litigants’ pro-domestic-law arguments are systematically
weaker than the merits of their pro-foreign-law arguments, one might
conclude that pro-domestic-law decision rates should be even lower
than those indicated in Table 2 and that the reason they are not is pro-
domestic-law bias.  On this theory, higher than expected pro-foreign-
227 See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 174, at 135–40 (discussing problem of case-
selection effects in context of interpreting litigation win rates).
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law decision rates would not necessarily indicate pro-foreign-law bias
either, since one would expect higher pro-foreign-law decision rates
from unbiased judges faced with systematically weak pro-domestic-
law arguments.  To interpret pro-domestic-law decision rates accu-
rately, then, one must control for the merits of litigants’ pro-domestic-
law arguments.228
To accomplish this, Table 3 compares hypothesized merits-based
pro-domestic-law decision rates with estimates of actual pro-domestic-
law decision rates for pro-domestic-law arguments of varying strength,
from strongest (beginning at the top of the table) to weakest (at the
bottom).  Because territoriality and personality pervade choice-of-law
doctrine,229 I used these factors to approximate the strength of pro-
228 See id. at 140 (interpreting win-rate data in face of case-selection effects requires
“teas[ing] out . . . the remaining implications of the case-strength factor”).  The extent of
the parties’ information about pro-domestic-law bias poses another interpretive challenge.
Suppose that Party A prefers domestic law, Party B prefers foreign law, and the parties
decide for themselves whether to settle the case or to litigate the choice-of-law dispute
before a particular judge.  Even if the judge has a pro-domestic-law bias, one might expect
a 50% pro-domestic-law decision rate if two conditions hold:  (1) The parties have very
accurate information about the extent of that bias, and (2) the information possessed by
the parties is identical.  Under these conditions, the parties would factor judicial bias into
their choice between settlement and litigation, thus selecting out cases in which bias would
strongly favor one party or the other. Cf. Steven Shavell, Any Frequency of Plaintiff Vic-
tory at Trial Is Possible, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 493, 499–501 (1996) (introducing parallel condi-
tions for achieving 50% win rate and concluding that 50% plaintiff win rate is not “central
tendency, either in theory or in fact”).  These conditions are rarely likely to hold, id. at 500,
but insofar as they do, one cannot infer from a 50% pro-domestic-law decision rate that
there is no pro-domestic-law bias.
Inferences of bias based on pro-domestic-law decision rates are also difficult when
information is asymmetric—a more likely situation.  If Party A knows about the judge’s
pro-domestic-law bias but Party B lacks this information, the choice-of-law issue will more
likely be litigated and is more likely to result in a pro-domestic-law decision. Cf. id. at 495
(noting that when defendants possess private information, cases going to trial are those in
which plaintiffs are relatively unlikely to win).  Under such conditions, it would be difficult
to determine how much of a pro-domestic-law decision rate greater than 50% is due to
pro-domestic-law bias and how much is due to asymmetric information.  Analogous inter-
pretive challenges may exist when making inferences based on pro-domestic-party and
pro-plaintiff decision rates. See infra note 251 and accompanying text.
However, unless information asymmetries systematically favor (or disfavor) parties
preferring domestic law (or domestic litigants or plaintiffs), the inferential threat appears
not to be substantial.  Furthermore, because it is relatively inexpensive to add a choice-of-
law issue to the issues being litigated, parties may tend to litigate choice-of-law issues
without considering information about bias.  More importantly, insofar as informational
considerations do pose a threat to my inferences, this threat is mitigated (but not elimi-
nated) by my reliance on statistical techniques designed to detect bias by (1) comparing
actual pro-domestic-law decision rates with the rates that would be expected if judges
based their choice-of-law decisions solely on the merits of litigants’ choice-of-law argu-
ments, see infra Table 3, and (2) controlling for the preferences of domestic litigants and
plaintiffs, preferences which are partly a function of information, see infra Table 4.  I thank
Andrew Guzman for encouraging me to reflect on these problems.
229 See supra Part IV.A.2 (noting failure of other studies to account for these factors).
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1257096
June 2009] MYTH OF MESS? 767
domestic-law arguments.230  I assume that, other things being equal,
pro-domestic-law arguments generally are strongest on the merits
when the locus of the activity giving rise to the litigation is mostly or
all inside U.S. territory and when the parties are mostly or all
domestic.  Under these conditions, the pro-domestic-law decision rate
of unbiased judges should approach 100%.  When either the locus of
activity or the nationality of the parties is balanced between domestic
and foreign, and the other factor is mostly or all domestic, the argu-
ment is not quite as strong, but the pro-domestic-law decision rate
should still be greater than 50%.  When both factors are balanced, the
rate should approximate 50%.  This should also be the case when one
factor is mostly or all domestic and the other is mostly or all for-
eign.231  I assume that pro-domestic-law arguments generally are
weakest when the locus of activity is mostly or all outside U.S. terri-
tory and the parties are mostly or all foreign.  Under these conditions,
the pro-domestic-law decision rate of unbiased judges should
approach 0%.
If U.S. district court judges are biased in favor of domestic law,
then the actual pro-domestic-law decision rates should be greater than
the hypothesized merits-based pro-domestic-law decision rates.  The
evidence suggests that this is not the case.  As Table 3 indicates, pro-
domestic-law decision rates are highest when pro-domestic-law argu-
ments are strongest (90.0% [57.4, 100.0] with forum non conveniens
cases; 88.9% [54.3, 100.0] without forum non conveniens cases) and
lowest when those arguments are weakest (15.0% [6.7, 29.5] with
forum non conveniens cases; 15.4% [5.5, 34.1] without).232
Moreover, the estimated actual decision rates generally approxi-
mate the hypothesized merits-based rates.  With forum non con-
veniens decisions included, estimated actual rates approximate the
hypothesized merits-based rates for all combinations except (Bal-
230 This measurement is certainly imperfect.  It fails to account for differences between
choice-of-law methods and for legal arguments based on those differences, which might
diverge from arguments based solely on territoriality and personality.  Moreover, some
choice-of-law doctrines are more territorial than others. See Whytock, supra note 117, at
211 tbl.4.10 (classifying territorial tendencies of different doctrines).  Therefore, territori-
ality and personality are only rough proxies for the merits of choice-of-law arguments.
While more accurate measures might reveal stronger doctrinal effects, these proxies can at
least show basic patterns in judges’ international choice-of-law decisions.
231 This assumes that the influence of these two factors would cancel each other out.
232 I coded territoriality and nationality using the same techniques used to code the
Activity Mostly/All Outside U.S. Territory and Parties Mostly/All Foreign variables.  How-
ever, for Table 3, I expanded each measure into three categories:  mostly/all domestic, bal-
anced (equal number of U.S. and non-U.S. territorial connections, equal number of U.S.
and non-U.S. parties), and mostly/all foreign (which have the same values as Activity
Mostly/All Outside Territory and Parties Mostly/All Foreign variables).
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TABLE 3
PRO-DOMESTIC-LAW DECISION RATES IN PUBLISHED
TRANSNATIONAL TORT CASES, CONTROLLING
FOR HYPOTHESIZED MERITS
Pro- Pro- EstimatedHypothesized EstimatedDomestic- Domestic- Actual Pro-Merits-Based Actual Pro-Law Law Domestic-Pro- Domestic-Locus of Nationality Decisions/ Decisions/ LawDomestic- LawActivity of Parties  Total  Total DecisionLaw DecisionDecisions Decisions RateDecision Rate (with(with (without (withoutRate FNC)FNC) FNC) FNC)
Mostly/All Mostly/All ≈100% 9/10 90.0% 8/9 88.9%
Domestic Domestic (Strongest) [57.4, 100.0] [54.3, 100.0]
Mostly/All Balanced >50% 15/17 88.2% 14/16 87.5%
Domestic [64.4, 98.0] [62.7, 97.8]
Balanced Mostly/All >50% 5/8 62.5% 4/5 80.0%
Domestic [30.4, 86.5] [36.0, 98.0]
Balanced Balanced ≈50% 11/32 34.4% 8/14 57.1%
[20.3, 51.8] [32.6, 78.7]
Mostly/All Mostly/All ≈50% 2/4 50.0% 2/3 66.7%
Domestic Foreign [15.0, 85.0] [20.2, 94.4]
Mostly/All Mostly/All ≈50% 16/36 44.4% 16/25 64.0%
Foreign Domestic [29.5, 60.4] [44.4, 79.8]
Mostly/All Balanced <50% 14/61 23.0% 14/29 48.3%
Foreign [14.1, 35.0] [31.4, 65.6]
Balanced Mostly/All <50% 0/4 0.0% 0/0 N/A
Foreign [0.0, 54.6]
Mostly/All Mostly/All ≈0% 6/40 15.0% 4/26 15.4%
Foreign Foreign (Weakest) [6.7, 29.5] [5.5, 34.1]
NOTES:  This table compares hypothesized merits-based international choice-of-law decision rates with
estimates of actual rates for various combinations of territoriality and nationality.  It presents results both
with and without forum non conveniens (FNC) decisions.  Insofar as judges are biased in favor of domestic
law, estimates of actual pro-domestic-law decision rates should be significantly higher than the hypothesized
merits-based rates.  As the table indicates, this is not the case.
anced, Balanced), and for that combination the estimated pro-
domestic-law decision rate is actually lower than hypothesized.  With
forum non conveniens decisions excluded, the estimated actual rates
approximate the hypothesized merits-based rates for all combinations
except (Balanced, Mostly/All Foreign), for which there are no obser-
vations.  However, the 95% confidence intervals indicate that there is
not 95% confidence that the overall estimate for (Balanced, Mostly/
All Domestic) is actually greater than 50%, or that the estimates for
(Mostly/All Foreign, Balanced) without forum non conveniens deci-
sions and (Balanced, Mostly/All Foreign) with forum non conveniens
decisions are actually less than 50%.  Ultimately, there is not 95%
confidence for any of the combinations, with or without forum non
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conveniens decisions, that the actual pro-domestic-law decision rate is
substantially greater than the hypothesized merits-based rate.
These findings suggest that, contrary to the mess claims, judges
are not biased in favor of domestic law, at least in published transna-
tional tort cases.  These findings also provide preliminary evidence
that choice-of-law decisions may be more predictable than the mess
claims imply.  Furthermore, insofar as territoriality and nationality are
accurate indicators of the legal strength of litigants’ choice-of-law
arguments, these findings indicate that the merits of litigants’ choice-
of-law arguments significantly influence judges’ choice-of-law
decisions.
2. Additional Findings
Several mess claims remain:  that choice-of-law doctrine does not
significantly influence choice-of-law decisionmaking; that choice-of-
law decisions are biased in favor of domestic over foreign litigants and
plaintiffs over defendants; and that choice-of-law decisionmaking is
highly unpredictable.233  To evaluate these claims empirically, I used
logit analysis, a standard statistical technique for estimating the effects
that hypothesized explanatory variables have on dependent variables
with only two possible values.234
Table 4 presents the results, excluding forum non conveniens
cases.235  It compares the effects posited by the mess claims with esti-
mates of the actual effect of each explanatory variable on the
probability that a U.S. district court judge will apply domestic rather
than foreign law in published transnational tort cases.  The explana-
tory variables are listed in the first column.  For each explanatory vari-
able, the second column indicates its effect as predicted by the mess
claims on the probability that a judge will apply domestic rather than
foreign law (no significant effect [≈0], or positive effect [+]).  The last
three columns present estimates, according to three statistical models,
of the actual effect of each explanatory variable on the probability of
233 For discussion of these claims see supra Part II.
234 Here, the dependent variable is Domestic Law, which either has the value of Yes (1)
for decisions that domestic law should apply, or No (0) for decisions that foreign law
should apply. See supra Part IV.B.2.  On logit analysis, see generally DAVID W. HOSMER
& STANLEY LEMESHOW, APPLIED LOGISTIC REGRESSION (2d ed. 2000).
235 Whenever inclusion of forum non conveniens cases changed results significantly, I
reported the differences.  As urged by leading empirical legal scholars, my presentation of
results emphasizes substance and estimates of uncertainty rather than technical statistical
measures. See, e.g., Epstein, Martin & Schneider, supra note 225, at 1827–38 (arguing for
better integration of substance and statistics).  Thus, Table 4 includes estimates of the
actual effect of each variable on the dependent variable, along with confidence intervals
conveying the degree of uncertainty associated with each estimate, rather than logit coeffi-
cients, standard errors, and p-values.  The latter statistics are available upon request.
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a pro-domestic-law decision, with 95% confidence intervals in
brackets.236
These three models test for effects by controlling for successively
more variables.  The dependent variable in all models is Domestic
Law.  Model 1 tests for doctrinal effects using only the Second
Restatement variable, without controlling for territoriality or nation-
ality.  Model 2 builds on Model 1 by adding Activity Mostly/All
Outside U.S. Territory and Parties Mostly/All Foreign to control for
territoriality and personality.  Model 3 builds on Model 2 by adding
the additional control variables Caseload, “Free” Foreign State, and
Judge Nominated by Republican. 
a. The Influence of Choice-of-Law Doctrine
The results are contrary to the mess claim that choice-of-law doc-
trine does not significantly influence choice-of-law decisionmaking.237
In Model 1, Second Restatement has a negative effect on Domestic
Law.  This is consistent with the theory that choice-of-law doctrine
matters; the Second Restatement should have a relatively low pro-
domestic-law decision rate if judges take the doctrine seriously.238
However, the confidence interval indicates there is not 95% certainty
that there is a negative effect.  This uncertainty is consistent with prior
findings about the effect of the Second Restatement, as compared to
the effects of other methods, in studies that do not control for territo-
riality and personality.239
Model 2, however, shows that the level of certainty increases, as
expected, when the analysis controls for territoriality and person-
ality.240  The estimated effect of Second Restatement on Domestic Law
is again negative, now with 95% certainty.  Judges are an estimated
236 I used the Clarify software program in Stata to simulate a change in the expected
value of the dependent variable caused by increasing each dichotomous explanatory vari-
able from 0 to 1 (and Caseload, a continuous variable, from its 25th to 75th percentile),
setting each of the other variables at its mode (for dichotomous variables) or mean (for
Caseload).  Michael Tomz, Jason Wittenberg & Gary King, CLARIFY:  Software for Inter-
preting and Presenting Statistical Results, Version 2.0 (2001), available at http://
gking.harvard.edu/stats.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2009) (only version 2.1 is currently
available).
237 For discussion of that claim see supra Part II.A.
238 See supra note 202 and accompanying text (discussing Second Restatement’s
expected doctrinal effect).
239 See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 55, at 378 (finding Second Restatement’s propensity
to favor forum law indistinguishable from that of other modern methods).
240 As discussed above, the expectation was that certainty should increase because the
statistical test controls for commonalities between the Second Restatement and other
methods and therefore is better able to detect effects resulting from their differences. See
supra Part IV.B.3.a.
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TABLE 4
EXPECTED AND ACTUAL EFFECTS ON PROBABILITY THAT





(Estimate and 95% Confidence Interval)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
–9.8% –22.8%** –26.8%**Second Restatement ≈0
[–29.3, 10.3] [–44.4, –2.6] [–46.3, –6.9]
Activity Mostly/All –26.3%** –35.9%**≈0
Outside U.S. Territory [–41.6, –10.4] [–55.5, –14.6]
Parties Mostly/All –40.2%** –40.2%**≈0
Foreign [–58.3, –18.3] [–60.4, –21.1]
U.S. Party Prefers –1.3% –18.1% –13.8%+
Domestic Law [–20.8, 18.7] [–39.4, 4.0] [–35.5, 9.5]
Plaintiff Prefers –17.9%* –18.0%* –18.1%+
Domestic Law [–33.8, 1.1] [–36.6, 2.8] [–41.7, 8.2]
2.8%Caseload N/A
[–11.9, 17.5]
–12.6%“Free” Foreign State N/A [–35.2, 11.9]
Judge Nominated by –18.5%*N/A
Republican [–38.5, 3.2]
Number of Observations 128 127 118
Decisions Correctly Classified 56.25% 74.02% 78.81%
Adjusted Count R-squared 1.75% 42.1% 54.6%
Area under Receiver Operating 0.5859 0.7954 0.8457
Characteristic (ROC) Curve
NOTES:  This table compares the effects posited by the mess claims with the estimated actual effect of each
explanatory variable on the dependent variable, Domestic Law, indicating the probability that a judge will
apply domestic rather than foreign law.  The explanatory variables are listed in the first column; the effects
expected by the mess claims are indicated in the second column (no significant effect [≈0], positive effect
[+]).  The last three columns present estimates of the actual effect of each explanatory variable on the
probability of a pro-domestic-law decision, with 95% confidence intervals in brackets.  The estimates were
generated using logit analysis and Clarify software, with forum non conveniens cases excluded.  Positive or
negative relationships for which there is 90% certainty are indicated by an asterisk (*), and those for which
there is 95% certainty are indicated by two asterisks (**).
22.8% less likely to make pro-domestic-law decisions when the
Second Restatement, rather than another method, provides the appli-
cable choice-of-law rule.  As Model 3 shows, this result holds even
after controlling for caseload, whether the foreign state is a liberal
democracy, and whether the judge was nominated by a Republican.
Second Restatement continues to have a negative effect on Domestic
Law with 95% certainty when forum non conveniens decisions are
included in the analysis.241  These results suggest that, contrary to the
mess claims, choice-of-law doctrine does affect decisions:  Application
of the Second Restatement is less likely to result in a pro-domestic-
241 With forum non conveniens decisions included, the estimated effect of Second
Restatement is –15.5% [–28.6, –1.1] in Model 2 and –14.6% [–26.7, –3.5] in Model 3.
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law decision compared to the other modern methods as a group and
more likely to result in a pro-foreign-law decision.
The strong negative effects of Activity Mostly/All Outside U.S.
Territory and Parties Mostly/All Foreign indicated in Models 2 and 3
provide additional evidence that doctrine matters.  Contrary to the
claim that choice-of-law doctrine does not significantly influence
choice-of-law decisions, these findings suggest that territoriality and
personality—two factors that pervade choice-of-law doctrine—in fact
have strong effects; these effects persist when forum non conveniens
decisions are included in the analysis.242
Table 5 provides a more fine-grained analysis of doctrinal effects.
In Table 4, the Second Restatement variable estimates the effect of the
Second Restatement on choice-of-law decisions compared to other
choice-of-law methods in general.  Table 5 estimates the effect of the
Second Restatement in comparison with three additional indicator
variables243:  an Interest Analysis variable, indicating use of interest
analysis or a combined modern method;244 a Lauritzen variable, indi-
cating use of the Lauritzen method;245 and an Other Methods variable,
which serves as a residual category indicating use of a method other
than the Second Restatement, interest analysis, a combined modern
242 With forum non conveniens decisions included, the estimated effect of Activity
Mostly/All Outside U.S. Territory is –35.0% [–48.9, –20.4] in Model 2 and –38.3% [–55.0,
–21.7] in Model 3; the estimated effect of Parties Mostly/All Foreign is –20.5% [–34.1, –6.9]
in Model 2 and –20.3% [–34.6, –8.9] in Model 3.
243 Coding of the additional indicator variables is based on Symeonides’s annual choice-
of-law surveys, except for the Lauritzen indicator, which is not included in Symeonides’s
classification scheme.  For citations to the surveys, see Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of
Law in the American Courts in 2007:  Twenty-First Annual Survey, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 243,
244 n.1 (2008).  All of the surveys are also available at http://www.willamette.edu/wucl/
journals/wlo/conflicts/.  The Lauritzen indicator was coded according to whether the
court’s opinion indicated application of the Lauritzen method.
244 I coded these together because both interest analysis and combined modern methods
aim to identify the state with the greatest interest in having its law applied. See SCOLES ET
AL., supra note 13, §§ 2.24–.25, at 102–05 (examining both approaches and relationship
between them).  Combined modern methods incorporate factors from methods other than
interest analysis, but these factors merely guide the analysis and do not change the basic
inquiry regarding the balance of state interests. See id. § 2.24, at 103 (identifying interest
analysis as integral to virtually all combined-modern methods).
245 Although similar in some respects to the Second Restatement, the Lauritzen method
deserves its own category due to a variety of differences.  Most significantly, the former has
a presumption in favor of the law of the place of injury, whereas the latter includes the
“[p]lace of the [w]rongful [a]ct” as a factor but explicitly limits the role of the place of
injury in its choice-of-law analysis. See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 583 (1953) (“The
test of location of the wrongful act or omission, however sufficient for torts ashore, is of
limited application to shipboard torts . . . .”); see also Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating
Co., 358 U.S. 354, 384 (1959) (holding that choice of law in maritime context “should not
depend on the wholly fortuitous circumstance of the place of injury”).
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method, or the Lauritzen method.246  I then re-analyzed Model 3 with
each of these new indicators included and with the Second Restate-
ment variable excluded as the reference category.247  The results are
presented in Table 5. 
TABLE 5
COMPARATIVE EFFECTS OF CHOICE-OF-LAW METHODS
Effect of Indicated Choice-of-Law Methods on
Probability of Pro-Domestic-Law Decision, Compared
to the Second Restatement
Interest Analysis Lauritzen Other Methods
With Forum Non +* +** +*
Conveniens 9.2% 27.1% 18.3%
Decisions [–1.7, 22.6] [6.8, 49.5] [–1.5, 43.9]
Without Forum +* +** +**
Non Conveniens 19.5% 37.7% 40.5%
Decisions [–1.6, 42.3] [6.1, 67.0] [1.7, 72.1]
NOTES:  This table indicates whether each listed choice-of-law category is more (+) or
less (–) likely to lead to a pro-domestic-law decision than the Second Restatement,
based on Model 3.  Results are presented both with and without forum non conveniens
decisions.  One asterisk (*) indicates 90% certainty, and two asterisks (**) indicate 95%
certainty regarding the specified positive or negative effect.  The table also estimates the
substantive impact of each method on the probability of a pro-domestic-law decision
compared to the reference category, along with associated 95% confidence intervals.
Table 5 indicates whether each choice-of-law category is more (+)
or less (–) likely to lead to a pro-domestic-law decision than the
Second Restatement.  It also estimates the substantive difference in
the probability that a judge will apply domestic law, along with associ-
ated 95% confidence intervals.  The results suggest that each of the
246 Due to the limited number of observations in the sample in which judges used “other
methods” (six for lex loci delicti, three for significant contacts, seven for lex fori, and two
for Leflar), these are grouped together into a single category.  Unfortunately, this study’s
data limitations do not allow reliable statistical analysis with separate indicators for each of
these other methods.  For this reason, the earlier Borchers and Thiel studies may shed
more light on subtle differences among the choice-of-law methods included in this cate-
gory. See supra notes 143–61 and accompanying text (analyzing Borchers and Thiel
studies).
247 When analyzing categorical variables, the indicator variable for the reference cate-
gory must be excluded from the model. See J. SCOTT LONG & JEREMY FREESE, REGRES-
SION MODELS FOR CATEGORICAL DEPENDENT VARIABLES USING STATA 417 (2d ed. 2006)
(explaining by way of example that to avoid perfect collinearity one categorical variable
must be excluded and serve as reference point relative to which included indicators’ coeffi-
cients are interpreted).
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other categories is more likely than the Second Restatement to result
in pro-domestic-law decisions.248
As one choice-of-law scholar has argued, “the great divide in
American choice of law is . . . between the First Restatement and eve-
rything else.”249  My results suggest that in international choice-of-
law, there is a significant divide between the Second Restatement and
other choice-of-law methods.250  Thus, the analysis not only indicates
that choice-of-law doctrine matters but also sheds light on how it
matters.
b. Little Evidence of Pro-Domestic-Party or Pro-Plaintiff Bias
My results also challenge the mess claims that judges are biased
in favor of domestic over foreign litigants and plaintiffs over defen-
dants.  Overall, when a U.S. party and a foreign party disagree about
the applicable law, U.S. district court judges decide in favor of the
domestic party at an estimated rate of 58.3%, although there is not
95% certainty that the actual rate is indeed greater than 50%.251
Moreover, as Table 4 indicates, a U.S. party’s preference for domestic
law does not increase the probability that a judge will apply domestic
law in any of the models.  In fact, the estimates suggest a negative
effect, though without 90% certainty.252
The results change when the variable is whether the U.S. party
prefers foreign law.  With forum non conveniens decisions included in
the analysis, there is at least 90% certainty in all models that U.S.
Party Prefers Foreign Law has a negative effect on Domestic Law,
248 It is unclear how these results might change if there were sufficient data to disaggre-
gate the Interest Analysis category into Symeonides’s separate categories for pure interest
analysis and combined modern methods or to disaggregate Other Methods into
Symeonides’s separate categories for First Restatement, significant contacts, lex fori, and
Leflar. See supra note 246.  Even with the aggregated categories, the results generally
were not statistically significant at a 95% level of confidence when using categories other
than the Second Restatement as the reference category (i.e., when estimating the effects of
the different methods compared to the Interest Analysis, Lauritzen, or Other Methods cate-
gory rather than the Second Restatement).
249 Borchers, supra note 55, at 377.
250 Because my data do not allow me to disaggregate the First Restatement from the
other methods in the analysis, the First Restatement’s status is unclear.
251 The 95% confidence interval is [45.7, 69.9].  When forum non conveniens cases are
included, the estimated rate is 53.3% [44.5, 61.9].  As discussed above, the possibility of
case-selection effects makes it difficult to interpret these decision rates. See supra notes
174–75 and accompanying text.  For this reason I also use the party preference variables to
test for bias.
252 However, there is 95% certainty of a negative effect in one specification of the
model:  Model 2, with forum non conveniens cases included.  When forum non conveniens
cases are included, the estimated effect of U.S. Party Prefers Domestic Law is –5.8%
[–18.5, 8.7] in Model 1; –13.8% [–26.8, –0.4] in Model 2; and –9.4% [–22.9, 2.5] in Model 3.
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indicating that when a U.S. party and a foreign party disagree about
the applicable law, the probability that a judge will decide in favor of
domestic law is lower if the U.S. party prefers foreign law.253  These
results suggest that there may indeed be some degree of pro-domestic-
party bias.  However, there is not 90% certainty of this effect when
forum non conveniens decisions are excluded from the analysis.254  In
the forum non conveniens context, the U.S. party is often a defendant
seeking to dismiss a lawsuit brought against it by a foreign plaintiff.255
Therefore, the negative effect of U.S. Party Prefers Foreign Law may
reflect judicial efforts to discourage forum shopping by foreign plain-
tiffs, rather than general pro-domestic-party bias in choice-of-law
decisionmaking.
Nor do the results support the mess claim of pro-plaintiff-bias.
Overall, U.S. district court judges decide in favor of the plaintiff’s pre-
ferred law at an estimated rate of 47.7% [38.6, 57.0].256  And as Table
4 indicates, a plaintiff’s preference for domestic law does not appear
to increase the probability that a judge will decide that domestic law
should apply.  In fact, the opposite may be true:  In Models 1 and 2
there is 90% certainty that when the plaintiff prefers domestic law and
the defendant prefers foreign law, a judge is less likely to decide in
favor of domestic law.  When forum non conveniens cases are
included, there is 95% certainty regarding this negative effect in all
models.257  This is not necessarily a surprising finding, particularly in
the forum non conveniens context.  Judges may simply be trying to
deter international forum shopping by removing one of the incentives
that draw plaintiffs to U.S. courts—U.S. law.  This impulse to deter
forum shopping may be outweighing any pro-plaintiff bias in judges’
choice-of-law decisions.
253 When forum non conveniens cases are included, the estimated effect of U.S. Party
Prefers Foreign Law is –13.8% [–26.1, 0.0] in Model 1; –13.7% [–27.0, 1.0] in Model 2; and
–12.2% [–24.2, –1.0] in Model 3.
254 When forum non conveniens cases are excluded, the estimated effect of U.S. Party
Prefers Foreign Law is –15.9% [–37.6, 7.2] in Model 1; –15.6% [–38.1, 9.7] in Model 2; and
–12.8% [–35.4, 10.8] in Model 3.
255 In an estimated 32.4% [26.4, 39.0] of forum non conveniens decisions in U.S. district
courts, there is a foreign plaintiff and a U.S. defendant. See Memorandum from
Christopher A. Whytock to the New York University Law Review, supra note 191
(describing author’s empirical data based on analysis of random sample of published U.S.
district court forum non conveniens cases).
256 When forum non conveniens cases are included, the estimated pro-plaintiff decision
rate is even lower:  31.1% [25.0, 37.9].
257 When forum non conveniens cases are included, the estimated effect of Plaintiff Pre-
fers Domestic Law is –34.5% [–50.0, –16.8] in Model 1, –37.5% [–54.4, –16.6] in Model 2,
and –35.4% [–54.9, –11.8] in Model 3.
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c. The Predictability of International Choice-of-Law
Decisionmaking
My results also indicate that international choice-of-law decision-
making may be more predictable than conventional wisdom sug-
gests.258  Model 3 correctly predicts international choice-of-law
decisions at a rate of 78.8%.259  The adjusted count R-squared figure
indicates that this represents a 54.6% improvement over the rate at
which decisions would be correctly predicted by always guessing the
more frequent outcome.260  Also, the area under the receiver oper-
ating characteristic (ROC) curve, 0.8457, indicates that Model 3 does
an excellent job discriminating between pro-domestic-law and pro-
foreign-law decisions.261
More importantly, international choice-of-law decisionmaking
appears to be predictable in a manner that may be useful to litigants.
Even relatively simple Model 2 has good predictive power.262  And as
258 Because the mess claims do not posit a specific level of unpredictability, I cannot
precisely compare it to my findings.  Therefore, a more definitive conclusion is not
possible.
259 This “correctly classified” figure indicates the proportion of outcomes that were cor-
rectly classified by the model using a 0.5 probability cutoff to translate predicted probabili-
ties into dichotomous predictions. See LAWRENCE C. HAMILTON, STATISTICS WITH STATA:
UPDATED FOR VERSION 9, at 270–71 (2006) (explaining correctly classified statistic).  Thus,
it indicates the proportion of outcomes for which the model estimated at least a 0.5
probability of a pro-domestic-law decision and in which the court in fact decided that
domestic law should apply.  When forum non conveniens decisions are included in the
analysis, the correctly classified figure is 76.12%.
260 When a dependent variable has only two possible outcomes (as is the case here), one
can correctly predict at least 50% of outcomes without any explanatory variables by always
guessing the outcome that is most frequent. LONG & FREESE, supra note 247, at 111.
Adjusted count R-squared uses this guessing strategy as a baseline to measure the
improvement in predictive power provided by a statistical model.  More precisely, adjusted
count R-squared is the proportion of correct predictions beyond the number that would be
correctly predicted simply by choosing the outcome with the largest percentage of
observed cases, using a 0.5 probability cutoff. Id. at 111–12.  When forum non conveniens
decisions are included, the adjusted count R-squared is 32.4%.
261 The ROC curve plots 1 minus the specificity (the false positive rate) on the x-axis
and sensitivity (the true positive rate) on the y-axis for each possible probability cutoff.
See Douglas G. Altman & J. Martin Bland, Diagnostic Tests 3:  Receiver Operating Charac-
teristic Plots, 309 BRIT. MED. J. 188, 188 (1994) (explaining ROC curve in medical diag-
nostic context).  The area under the ROC curve is equal to the probability that a random
pro-domestic-law decision has a higher value of the dependent variable than a random pro-
foreign-law decision. Id.  The larger the area under the curve, the more discriminating the
model. Id.  One rule of thumb is that an area of 0.7 to 0.8 is acceptable discrimination, 0.8
to 0.9 is excellent discrimination, and greater than 0.9 is outstanding discrimination.
HOSMER & LEMESHOW, supra note 234, at 162.  When forum non conveniens decisions are
included in the sample, the area under the ROC curve is 0.7862.
262 Model 2 requires knowledge of the applicable choice-of-law method (whether or not
it is the Second Restatement), the territorial locus of the activity, the nationality of the
parties, the U.S. party’s preference, and the plaintiff’s preference.  This information should
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Table 3 indicates, a judge is most likely to apply domestic law when
the locus of the underlying activity is mostly or all inside U.S. territory
and the parties are mostly or all domestic, and she is least likely to do
so when the locus of activity is mostly or all outside U.S. territory and
the parties are mostly or all foreign.  This approach to prediction
decreases in usefulness as territoriality and personality become more
balanced, and it does not incorporate other factors that may influence
choice-of-law decisionmaking.  Nevertheless, it provides a fairly
simple rule of thumb that may help transnational actors reduce their
uncertainty about applicable law.
d. Effect of Control Variables Is Ambiguous
Model 3 indicates that at least one of my control variables may
significantly affect choice-of-law decisionmaking, although this effect
is less certain than others in the study. Caseload has the hypothesized
positive effect on the pro-domestic-law decision rate (judges apply
domestic law more often when they have higher caseloads); and
“Free” Foreign State has a negative effect (judges apply domestic law
less often when a “free” state supplies the applicable foreign law).
However, neither of these effects reaches a 90% level of certainty.263
The evidence regarding the effect of judges’ ideological attitudes
is more intriguing.  Judges nominated by Republican presidents are an
estimated 18.5% less likely to apply domestic law; this effect is statisti-
cally significant at a 90% (but not 95%) level of confidence.  This
result might be explained by a particularly strong conservative desire
to deter plaintiffs seeking more favorable U.S. law from engaging in
international forum shopping in U.S. courts.  However, when forum
non conveniens cases are included, even 90% certainty about the exis-
tence of this effect is lost.  Moreover, the estimated substantive effects
of Second Restatement (–26.8%), Activity Mostly/All Outside U.S. Ter-
ritory (–35.9%), and Parties Mostly/All Foreign (–40.2%) are all
stronger than that of Judge Nominated by Republican (–18.5%).  This
suggests that even if judges’ ideologies do significantly influence inter-
ordinarily be available to litigants.  Model 2 correctly predicts international choice-of-law
decisions at a rate of 74.0%; the adjusted count R-squared figure indicates that this repre-
sents a 42.1% improvement over the rate at which decisions would be correctly predicted
by always guessing the more frequent outcome; and the area under the ROC curve is
0.7954, which is on the border between acceptable and excellent discrimination. See supra
Table 4.
263 When forum non conveniens cases are included, there still is neither 90% nor 95%
certainty as to whether Caseload or “Free” Foreign State affects Domestic Law.
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national choice-of-law decisions, the influence of doctrinal factors—
including territoriality and personality—is likely stronger.264
As indicated by the test statistics reported for Models 2 and 3
in Table 4, the predictive power of the statistical model increased
when the Caseload, “Free” Foreign State, and Judge Nominated by
Republican variables were included.265  This suggests that, taken
together, these factors may play at least some role in choice-of-law
decisionmaking.  The caseload, liberal international relations theory,
and attitudinal hypotheses may therefore merit further investigation.
Although not expressly contemplated by the mess claims, a finding
that one or more of these factors do in fact significantly affect choice-
of-law decisions would be consistent with the general tenor of those
claims:  that choice-of-law decisions are based on factors other than
the relevant facts and applicable choice-of-law method.  For example,
if further analysis were to confirm that judges’ partisan ideologies sig-
nificantly influence their choice-of-law decisions, this would seem to
support a new mess claim—namely, that choice-of-law decisions are
ideological.  Overall, however, the present findings suggest that the




My study has implications beyond international choice-of-law
decisionmaking; in particular, it provides preliminary empirical sup-
port for theories about the contributions choice of law makes to global
governance.  Moreover, although my findings are based on analysis of
published international choice-of-law decisions in tort cases, they
might plausibly extend to unpublished decisions and choice of law in
the domestic arena as well.  This Part discusses these implications and
possible extensions.
A. Implications for Global Governance
In theory, a choice-of-law system has the potential to make
important contributions to global governance.266  Law-and-economics
264 However, Joshua Fischman and David Law argue that tests of ideological effects
using party of appointment as a proxy tend to underestimate the impact of ideology.
Fischman & Law, supra note 224 (manuscript at 25).  According to them, results of this
type are “best interpreted as providing only a lower bound on ideology.” Id.
265 See supra notes 259–62 and accompanying text.  Differences between the “decisions
correctly classified,” “adjusted count r-squared,” and “area under ROC curve” figures for
Models 2 and 3 are particularly indicative. See supra Table 4.
266 See supra Part III.
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scholars argue that choice-of-law doctrine can enhance global eco-
nomic welfare by creating incentives for private actors to behave effi-
ciently and for states to adopt efficient laws.  Rule-of-law theories
require official decisionmaking—including judicial decisionmaking—
to be impartial, predictable, and based on publicly announced rules.
They also require that private actors generally comply with applicable
legal rules.  Choice-of-law doctrine can enhance transnational rule of
law by providing judges with publicly announced rules for making
impartial and predictable choice-of-law decisions.  Focal point, reputa-
tional, and normative theories of compliance suggest that a choice-of-
law system can also enhance transnational rule of law by increasing
certainty about which law private actors should follow when their
activities have connections to more than one state.267  According to
theories of bargaining in the shadow of the law, bargaining outcomes
among transnational actors depend on their expectations about which
law will apply to their transactions in the event of litigation.  A choice-
of-law system can facilitate transnational bargaining by clarifying
these expectations.  Together, these theories suggest that choice-of-
law doctrine—and the judges who apply it—provide an essential foun-
dation for global governance.
However, the mess claims raise serious doubts about these theo-
ries.268  They suggest that if the choice-of-law system affects global
governance at all, its impact is more likely harmful than beneficial.
Specifically, the mess claims posit that choice-of-law doctrine does not
significantly affect choice-of-law decisionmaking.  If this were true,
then contrary to rule-of-law principles, judges’ choice-of-law decisions
would be based on factors other than publicly announced rules, and
even the best designed choice-of-law rules would not systematically
benefit global economic welfare.  Another mess claim asserts that
choice-of-law decisions are biased in favor of domestic over foreign
law, domestic over foreign litigants, and plaintiffs over defendants.  If
this claim were correct, choice-of-law decisions would systematically
undermine the rule-of-law values of generality and impartiality.
Finally, according to the mess claims, choice-of-law decisionmaking is
highly unpredictable.  Insofar as this claim is accurate, a choice-of-law
system cannot hope to make beneficial contributions to global govern-
ance because the potential contributions discussed above all require
some degree of certainty about the applicable law.  Worse, to the
extent that the choice-of-law system itself creates this uncertainty, it
may actually reduce global economic welfare, undermine transna-
267 See supra notes 110–14 and accompanying text.
268 See supra Part III.
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tional rule of law, and hinder transnational bargaining.  Thus, the mess
claims—if true—would be discouraging from a global governance
perspective.
In contrast, the evidence presented in this Article offers support
for the idea that choice-of-law systems may positively contribute to
global governance.269  My finding that choice-of-law doctrine does sig-
nificantly affect judges’ choice-of-law decisions provides preliminary
empirical support for law-and-economics theories about the poten-
tially positive global economic consequences of choice-of-law doc-
trine.  It also indicates that, consistent with rule-of-law principles,
judges’ international choice-of-law decisions may generally be based
on good faith analysis using the applicable choice-of-law methods.
Even the Second Restatement—long criticized as indeterminate and
subject to judicial manipulation270—appears to have a distinct influ-
ence on international choice-of-law decisionmaking.
My finding that judges’ choice-of-law decisions are not systemati-
cally biased in the ways posited by the mess claims is another reason
to be hopeful about choice of law’s contributions to global govern-
ance.  This finding suggests both that bias generally will not trump the
efficiency concerns embodied in future well-designed choice-of-law
rules and that U.S. district courts usually demonstrate impartiality in
international choice-of-law decisionmaking, thus supporting transna-
tional rule of law.  This finding also suggests that modern choice-of-
law methods may not have the negative economic consequences
posited by some economic analyses.  For example, according to one
law-and-economics critique, the pro-domestic-law bias of modern
choice-of-law methods results in discriminatory application of more
stringent U.S. tort standards to U.S. businesses, thus reducing global
economic welfare.271  However, my findings suggest that the modern
methods are not systematically biased in favor of domestic law and
that the Second Restatement—the most widely adopted modern
method—is less likely than the other methods as a group to result in
application of domestic law.  Thus, it is not clear that the modern
methods pose a threat to global economic welfare.272
269 See supra Part IV.
270 See supra notes 197–200 and accompanying text.
271 See supra notes 102–07 and accompanying text.
272 As already noted, my data do not permit me to compare directly the pro-domestic-
law tendencies of the First and Second Restatements.  It may be that from the perspective
of this particular law-and-economics critique of the modern methods, the First Restate-
ment is generally more desirable.  However, Thiel’s findings suggest that the Second
Restatement is “on average in agreement” with the First Restatement.  Thiel, supra note
11, at 312.
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Finally, the finding that judges’ international choice-of-law deci-
sions are fairly predictable has positive implications for global govern-
ance, because some degree of predictability is necessary for choice of
law to increase global economic welfare, enhance transnational rule of
law, or facilitate transnational bargaining.  Even higher levels of pre-
dictability may be necessary or desirable for truly effective govern-
ance.  At a minimum, however, the findings suggest that choice-of-law
decisionmaking is more predictable than conventional wisdom
assumes:  With control variables included, this Article’s statistical
model correctly predicted international choice-of-law decisions at a
rate of almost 80%.273  Perhaps of more practical interest, it appears
that a rule of thumb based on two factors that permeate choice-of-law
doctrine—territoriality and personality—may often help reduce
uncertainty surrounding transnational actors’ expectations about
choice-of-law decisionmaking.274
This Article thus provides new empirical support for the proposi-
tion that choice of law can increase global economic welfare, enhance
transnational rule of law, and facilitate bargaining among transna-
tional actors.  To be sure, the evidence falls far short of conclusively
demonstrating these effects.  However, the results suggest that choice
of law’s contributions to global governance may be more significant
and beneficial than the mess claims imply.
B. Extension to Unpublished Decisions
My findings are based on analysis of published court decisions.
However, published court decisions are not necessarily representative
of court decisions in general.275  This has led some scholars to criticize
choice-of-law studies that rely solely on the analysis of published deci-
sions.276  As explained above, published international choice-of-law
decisions are my primary population of interest because these deci-
sions are most likely to affect global governance.277  As long as I limit
273 See supra Part IV.C.2.c.
274 Id.
275 See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 174, at 125–26 (explaining that published
decisions are small percentage of total judicial decisions).
276 See, e.g., Levin, supra note 1, at 257–58 (criticizing Symeonides study for basing its
empirical analysis on published decisions).
277 See supra Part IV.B.1.  Similarly, focusing on published cases is appropriate when
one seeks to understand the “shadow of the law”—that is, the broad impact of court deci-
sions on both litigants and non-litigants. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 116, at
968–69 (explaining concept of bargaining “in the shadow of the law” in divorce context).  It
also is appropriate when the analytic goal is to understand the development of legal doc-
trine, Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, CAFA Judicata:  A Tale of Waste and
Politics, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1559–60 (2008) (arguing that published—not unpub-
lished—decisions “move the law”), or the public policy output of courts, Susan M. Olson,
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my conclusions to this population, this Article’s reliance on published
cases does not pose a representativeness problem.278  But can I extend
my findings to the broader population of all decisions (both published
and unpublished)?  The answer depends on the relationship between
the determinants of publication and the variables included in my sta-
tistical model.  While I draw no firm conclusions, it appears, as
demonstrated below, that for both descriptive and causal inferences
my findings may plausibly extend to unpublished international choice-
of-law decisions.
1. Descriptive Inferences
Descriptive inference is the analysis of observed facts (the fea-
tures of a sample) to learn about unobserved facts (the features of a
population).279  For example, I made the descriptive inference based
on my sample that in 37.1% [30.9, 43.8] of published international
choice-of-law decisions by U.S. district court judges in tort cases,
judges decided that domestic rather than foreign law should apply.280
Unrepresentativeness leads to selection bias if any criterion used to
select the sample upon which those inferences are based (here,
whether a decision was published) is correlated with the feature of the
population about which the inferences are being drawn (here, whether
the judge applied domestic law).281
Relatively little is known about the determinants of U.S. district
court judges’ publication decisions.  However, evidence suggests that a
judge may be more likely to publish a decision if it is “complex”;282
Studying Federal District Courts Through Published Cases:  A Research Note, 15 JUST. SYS.
J. 782, 795 (1992) (“[U]sing reported cases may be most justifiable for a researcher who is
trying to study efficiently the ‘public policy’ output of district courts.”).
278 The question of representativeness asks:  “[A]re we entitled to generalize from a
given case or cases under study to a larger universe of cases?  Do we have reason to believe
that what is true for the sample is also true for the population?” JOHN GERRING, SOCIAL
SCIENCE METHODOLOGY:  A CRITERIAL FRAMEWORK 181 (2001); see also DAVID
FREEDMAN ET AL., STATISTICS 334 (2007) (“Estimating parameters [of the population]
from the sample is justified when the sample represents the population.”).  If the popula-
tion of interest is defined as all U.S. judicial decisions (both published and unpublished),
there is a potential representativeness problem. See Siegelman & Donohue, supra note
120, at 1134 (“The unrepresentative nature of appellate cases is now widely accepted
among social scientists.  But a similar problem has commanded far less attention:  district
court cases with published opinions may be subject to the same kinds of sample selection
problems that confront users of appellate cases.”).  But if the population of interest is pub-
lished decisions only, reliance on a random sample of published decisions is appropriate
because the sample is representative of the population. See Epstein & King, supra note
186, at 106–07 (discussing representativeness problem).
279 Epstein & King, supra note 186, at 29–30.
280 See supra Table 2.
281 Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 120, at 1145.
282 Id. at 1150.
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the amount in controversy is high;283 the decision “lays down a new
rule of law, or alters or modifies an existing rule,” “involves a legal
issue of continuing public interest,” “criticizes existing law,” or
“resolves an apparent conflict of authority” (I refer to these factors
collectively as “official factors”);284 the parties include a large com-
pany or law firm;285 the judge sits in the Northern District of Illinois,
the Southern District of New York, or the Northern District of
Texas,286 or in the First or Seventh Circuit;287 the judge finds the issue
particularly salient;288 or the decision is consistent with her ide-
ology.289  A judge may be less likely to publish a decision when her
caseload is high290 or when the federal government is a party.291
Available data allowed me to measure the correlations between
most of these potential determinants of publication and international
choice-of-law decisions:  All correlations were weak.292  Due to a lack
283 Id. at 1152.
284 COMM. ON USE OF APPELLATE COURT ENERGIES, ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR APPEL-
LATE JUSTICE, STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS 15–17 (1973).  I refer
to these as “official factors” because they are the factors identified in the formal publica-
tion guidelines for U.S. district courts issued by the 1973 Advisory Council for Appellate
Justice Report. Id.; see also Karen Swenson, Federal District Court Judges and the Decision
to Publish, 25 JUST. SYS. J. 121, 121, 136–37 (2004) (listing these factors).
285 Swenson, supra note 284, at 137.
286 Margo Schlanger & Denise Lieberman, Using Court Records for Research, Teaching,
and Policymaking:  The Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse, 75 UMKC L. REV. 155, 166
(2006).
287 Swenson, supra note 284, at 136.
288 See C.K. ROWLAND & ROBERT A. CARP, POLITICS AND JUDGMENT IN FEDERAL
DISTRICT COURTS 19 (1996) (“[A]lmost by definition West publishes only those decisions
which the judges themselves (or their clerks) regard as inherently significant and worthy.”).
289 See Swenson, supra note 284, at 125 (“Ideology may affect publication rates because
judges place more stock in or have more attachment to opinions that agree with their
ideology and, thus, are more likely to deem these opinions worthy of publication.”).
290 See David C. Vladeck & Mitu Gulati, Judicial Triage:  Reflections on the Debate over
Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1669–70 (2005) (noting that with
increased case loads, growing percentage of opinions are unpublished).
291 Swenson, supra note 284, at 135.
292 I tested for correlations between my dependent variable, Domestic Law, and the
following potential determinants of publication (the first number in parentheses is the cor-
relation coefficient excluding forum non conveniens decisions; the second is the correlation
coefficient including forum non conveniens decisions):  “complexity,” measured by the
number of pages devoted to the choice-of-law analysis (0.0044, 0.1850); involvement of a
large company or law firm, measured by the presence of a business entity as a plaintiff and/
or as a defendant (–0.0059, –0.0395); Northern District of Illinois, Southern District of New
York, or Northern District of Texas (–0.0587, –0.1352); First or Seventh Circuit (–0.1897,
–0.1173); various measures of salience, including the existence of a political issue (coded as
“yes” if there is a human-rights, constitutional-rights, cross-border environmental, ter-
rorism, or war-related issue) (–0.0354, 0.0653) and whether federal law is involved
(–0.0408, –0.0077); the judge’s ideology, measured by the party of the nominating president
(–0.1431, –0.0637); caseload, measured in the same way described in Part IV.B.4 of this
Article (0.0611, 0.0233); and the presence of a federal government party (0.1129, 0.1268).
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of data, I could not measure the correlations for amount in contro-
versy and official factors, but there do not appear to be strong theoret-
ical reasons for expecting these potential determinants to be
correlated with judges’ international choice-of-law decisions.293  This
analysis suggests that my descriptive inferences might be generalizable
to unpublished decisions.  However, given limited data and limited
knowledge about the determinants of publication, this analysis is far
from conclusive.  Any generalizations of my descriptive inferences to
unpublished decisions should be considered tentative until they are
confirmed by an analysis of unpublished decisions.
2. Causal Inferences
Causal inference is the analysis of observed facts about a sample
in order to estimate cause-and-effect relationships between hypothe-
sized explanatory variables and a specified dependent variable.294  For
example, I made the causal inference that the territorial locus of the
activity giving rise to litigation influences the likelihood that a judge
will decide that domestic law should apply.295  Unrepresentativeness
creates sample-selection bias in causal inferences if both of two condi-
tions are met:  (1) a criterion used to select the sample upon which the
inferences are based (e.g., whether a decision was published) is a
cause of the dependent variable (e.g., whether the judge applied
domestic law); and (2) that criterion is correlated with an explanatory
variable of interest (e.g., the territorial locus of activity) but is not
itself included as an explanatory variable in the model.296
Regarding the first condition, I used a series of bivariate logit
analyses to evaluate whether various potential determinants of publi-
cation also affect the likelihood of a pro-domestic-law decision.  The
All of these correlations are very weak. See ANTHONY STEWART, BASIC STATISTICS AND
EPIDEMIOLOGY:  A PRACTICAL GUIDE 65 (2007) (“When assessing the strength of an asso-
ciation using r [the Pearson correlation coefficient], 0 to 0.19 is regarded as very weak, 0.2
to 0.39 weak, 0.40 to 0.59 moderate, 0.6 to 0.79 strong and 0.8 to 1 very strong.  These
values can be plus or minus.”).
293 A possible exception:  If one assumes that judges are more likely to apply domestic
law in cases where more is at stake economically, then both the likelihood of publication
and the likelihood of a pro-domestic-law decision would potentially increase as the amount
in controversy increases.  If this theory is correct, then my sample may overrepresent pro-
domestic-law decisions and actual pro-domestic-law decision rates may be even lower than
my analysis suggests.
294 Epstein & King, supra note 186, at 34–36.
295 See supra Table 4.
296 GARY KING, ROBERT O. KEOHANE & SIDNEY VERBA, DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY:
SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 169 (1994) (explaining causes of
omitted variable bias); James J. Heckman, Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error,
47 ECONOMETRICA 153, 153–54 (1979) (explaining that sample selection bias is analogous
to omitted variable bias).
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results were generally negative.297  Regarding the second condition,
available data allowed me to measure the correlations between most
of the potential determinants of publication and the explanatory vari-
ables included in my statistical models.298  These correlations were
generally weak.299  Again, due to a lack of data, I could not measure
the correlations with amount in controversy or official factors, but
there do not appear to be strong theoretical reasons for expecting
these potential determinants to be correlated with the explanatory
variables.  This analysis suggests that my causal inferences might be
generalizable to unpublished decisions, though again, the analysis is
not conclusive.  As with my descriptive inferences, any generalizations
of my causal inferences to unpublished decisions should be considered
tentative until they are confirmed by an analysis of unpublished
decisions.
C. Extension to Domestic Choice-of-Law Decisions
This Article’s findings are based on analysis of international
choice-of-law decisions; it is unclear whether they can be extended to
other choice-of-law decisionmaking contexts.  At a minimum, these
findings suggest a caveat to the conventional wisdom about choice of
law:  Even if the mess claims describe domestic choice of law accu-
rately, they do not appear to describe international choice of law
accurately.
But might my findings have implications for choice of law more
generally?  A definite answer would require further empirical analysis
using data from both domestic and international choice-of-law deci-
297 The independent variables in the logit analyses were the same potential determinants
of publication used in the correlation tests above, and the dependent variable was
Domestic Law.  The resulting p-values were greater than 0.100 (indicating that there is not
90% confidence in such a relationship), with only the following exceptions:  “complexity,”
as measured by the number of pages of choice-of-law analysis (only with forum non con-
veniens decisions included); Northern District of Illinois, Southern District of New York,
or Northern District of Texas (only with forum non conveniens decisions included); First
Circuit or Seventh Circuit (both with and without forum non conveniens decisions
included); and presence of a federal government party (only with forum non conveniens
decisions included).
298 As Model 3 shows, my results hold when measures of caseload and judicial ideology
are included. See supra Part IV.C.2.
299 The correlation coefficients for each combination are available upon request.  The
correlation between the Lauritzen variable and one measure of salience (whether federal
law is involved) was high (0.8860 without forum non conveniens cases, 0.8834 with them),
which is unsurprising since the Lauritzen method applies to maritime cases and maritime
cases in federal courts usually involve federal law.  The correlation between the Interest
Analysis variable and this federal law measure of salience was moderate (–0.4735 without
forum non conveniens decisions, –0.4459 with them).  However, logit analysis indicates
that this salience measure is not causally related to the dependent variable, Domestic Law.
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sions.  Until then, any generalization to domestic choice of law must
be made with caution, particularly in light of arguments that transna-
tional litigation is fundamentally different than domestic litigation.300
Such an extension seems plausible, however, for at least two rea-
sons.  First, prior empirical studies generally supporting various mess
claims in the context of choice of law might have reached different
results had they attempted—as this Article does—to control for terri-
toriality and personality.  Controlling for these variables would have
allowed these studies to measure more accurately the effect of choice-
of-law doctrine on judges’ choice-of-law decisions by controlling for
the merits of litigants’ choice-of-law arguments in order to mitigate
potential case-selection effects.  Second, insofar as there is pro-
domestic-law and pro-domestic-party bias in choice-of-law decision-
making, one might expect this bias to be even more pronounced in the
international context.301  If the mess claims exaggerate the effect of
bias on international choice-of-law decisionmaking, they may exag-
gerate this effect even more in the domestic context.
CONCLUSION
Choice of law can have important effects on global governance.
In particular, it can increase or decrease global economic welfare,
enhance or undermine transnational rule of law, and facilitate or
hinder bargaining among transnational actors.302  But according to
conventional wisdom, choice of law is a mess:  Choice-of-law doctrine
does not significantly influence judges’ choice-of-law decisions; those
decisions are instead motivated by judicial biases in favor of domestic
law, domestic parties, and plaintiffs; and the decisions are highly
unpredictable.303  If the mess claims are accurate, then international
choice of law’s effects on global governance—if any—are more likely
to be harmful than beneficial.304
This Article has presented evidence that the mess claims do not
accurately describe international choice of law.305  My analysis sug-
gests that choice-of-law doctrine does significantly influence interna-
tional choice-of-law decisionmaking by U.S. district courts in
300 See Baumgartner, supra note 178, at 1304, 1391 (noting factors that differentiate “the
process of lawmaking for transnational litigation” from “purely domestic lawmaking
process”).
301 Some studies indicate a U.S. court bias against foreign parties, while others contra-
dict this finding. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
302 See supra Part III.
303 See supra Part II.
304 See supra Part III.
305 See supra Part IV.C.
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published tort cases.  For instance, two factors that permeate choice-
of-law doctrine, territoriality and personality, have an important
impact on international choice-of-law decisionmaking.306  Moreover,
the Second Restatement is apparently less likely to lead to the appli-
cation of domestic law (and more likely to lead to the application of
foreign law) than other choice-of-law methods as a group.307  My anal-
ysis also suggests that there is neither a pro-domestic-law nor a pro-
plaintiff bias.  Although judicial efforts to discourage forum shopping
by foreign plaintiffs may influence choice-of-law decisions, there does
not appear to be any general bias in favor of U.S. litigants.308  In addi-
tion, choice-of-law decisionmaking appears to be quite predictable.309
These findings offer some good news concerning choice of law’s con-
tributions to global governance.310
These findings have significant implications for choice-of-law
scholarship.  At a minimum, they suggest a caveat to the conventional
wisdom about choice of law:  However accurately the mess claims may
describe domestic choice of law, international choice of law does not
appear to be as much of a mess as conventional wisdom suggests.  Fur-
ther, preliminary analysis indicates that the Article’s findings may
plausibly extend from published international choice-of-law decisions
to unpublished and domestic choice-of-law decisions.311  Insofar as
such extensions are possible, the Article’s findings pose a more gen-
eral challenge to the mess claims, reinforcing some results from prior
empirical studies312 while differing from others.313
306 See supra notes 169–71, 208–13, 229–42 and accompanying text and tables.
307 More specifically, the evidence suggests that the Second Restatement is less likely to
lead to the application of domestic law than each of the following three categories of
choice-of-law methods:  (1) interest analysis and combined modern methods; (2) the
Lauritzen method; and (3) a residual category of other methods (including the First
Restatement, lex fori, Leflar, and significant contacts).  However, due to data limitations,
my analysis was not able to compare the effects of the Second Restatement with those of
the First Restatement specifically. See supra note 248 and accompanying text and table.
308 See supra Part IV.C.2.b.
309 See supra Part IV.C.2.c.
310 See supra Part V.A.
311 See supra Part V.B–C.
312 For example, I found significant differences between the pro-domestic-law decision
rates of the Second Restatement and other methods, consistent with Thiel’s similar find-
ings. See supra notes 157–61 and accompanying text.  I also found no systematic pro-
domestic-law, pro-domestic-party, or pro-plaintiff bias, consistent with Symeonides’s sim-
ilar findings in the products liability context. See supra notes 162–64 and accompanying
text.
313 For example, my evidence indicates significant doctrinal effects on choice-of-law
decisions, while Borchers’s study revealed no statistically significant differences in out-
comes among the modern methods. See supra notes 149–54 and accompanying text.  Simi-
larly, I found no systematic pro-domestic-law, pro-domestic-party, or pro-plaintiff bias,
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Choice-of-law scholars have sometimes used the mess claims to
call for doctrinal reform.314  While reform may still be necessary, this
Article’s findings indicate that judges are doing a better job of making
choice-of-law decisions under the current methods than is widely
believed.  One choice-of-law reform effort seeks to identify the “true
rules” that drive judges’ choice-of-law decisions; this could increase
transparency in choice-of-law decisionmaking by making these rules
explicit in choice-of-law doctrine.315  My findings suggest that the
principles of territoriality and personality together may constitute one
such “true rule.”  These factors permeate choice-of-law doctrine,
explicitly in some choice-of-law methods but only implicitly in
others.316  Thus transparency might be enhanced by consistently
making these factors more explicit in doctrine.  Ultimately, as
Richman and Reynolds note, “[w]hat to make of these ‘true rules’ is a
separate normative question. . . . Regardless of the answer, however,
drafters of a future [conflict of laws] restatement should at least know
of the existence of all colorable candidates for ‘true rule’ status.”317
This Article’s findings also have significance beyond choice of law
and global governance.  Contrary to the skeptical views of many polit-
ical scientists and a growing number of legal scholars,318 my findings
suggest that legal doctrine matters in judicial decisionmaking.  Fur-
thermore, contrary to common claims of “xenophobia” in U.S.
courts,319 district court judges’ international choice-of-law decisions
do not appear to be systematically biased against foreign litigants.320
The results also shed light on the modern meaning and signifi-
cance of territoriality—the notion that the scope of state authority is
defined by reference to state borders.  Territoriality is central to the
classic Westphalian concept of sovereignty, and legal scholars and
international relations scholars have become very interested in deter-
mining the extent to which globalization has eroded its significance.321
Quantitatively, my findings indicate that territoriality persists strongly
while the Borchers study suggested such biases. See supra notes 143–48 and accompanying
text.
314 See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 55, at 382–84 (using findings as basis for prescribing
changes to choice-of-law doctrine); Solimine, supra note 15, at 89–92 (same).
315 Richman & Reynolds, supra note 55, at 432–33.
316 See supra notes 169–72 and accompanying text.
317 Richman & Reynolds, supra note 55, at 433.
318 See Friedman, supra note 56, at 262–65 (analyzing this scholarly view).
319 See supra note 79.
320 See supra Part IV.C.2.b.  This finding is consistent with Clermont & Eisenberg, supra
note 79, at 464 (“[T]he data offer no support for the existence of xenophobic bias in U.S.
courts.”).
321 See generally Kal Raustiala, The Evolution of Territoriality:  International Relations
and American Law, in TERRITORIALITY AND CONFLICT IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION
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in international choice-of-law decisionmaking.322  Qualitatively, how-
ever, this persistent territoriality is not the strict Westphalian territori-
ality of the past, according to which a state’s authority was deemed
not to extend beyond its borders.323  Rather, it is a more relaxed
neoterritorial conception:  It depends not on a strict territorial/extra-
territorial distinction but rather on an estimate of the territorial locus
of transnational activity.324  Territoriality—even in this relaxed form—
is not necessarily the ideal guide for allocating prescriptive
authority.325  But, for better or worse, territoriality persists in interna-
tional choice-of-law decisionmaking, at least in tort cases.
More broadly, this Article is an example of “governance-oriented
analysis” of transnational law, which seeks to improve understanding
of the role of domestic courts in global governance.326  Governance-
oriented analysis has two principal methodological characteristics.
First, as a complement to doctrinal analysis of transnational law, it
studies “transnational law in action.”  Specifically, it analyzes how
judges actually apply transnational law to determine the rights and
obligations of transnational actors, and how judges allocate govern-
ance authority among states, between national and international insti-
tutions, and between public and private actors.327  When they make
international choice-of-law decisions, domestic courts allocate pre-
scriptive authority among states.328  While taking the role of choice-of-
law doctrine seriously, this Article has analyzed how U.S. district
court judges actually apply that doctrine to allocate prescriptive
authority.
219 (Miles Kahler & Barbara F. Walter eds., 2006) (arguing that in United States “territori-
ality has been slowly unbundled from sovereignty”).
322 See supra notes 240–42 and accompanying text; see also SYMEONIDES, supra note 18,
at 387 (concluding that territoriality continues to play important role in modern choice-of-
law decisionmaking).
323 See generally STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY:  ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 20–25
(1999) (explaining “Westphalian sovereignty”).
324 Whytock, supra note 117, at 247–48.
325 For example, legal pluralists argue that alternative jurisdictional principles that take
non-territorial attachments seriously would be preferable. See generally Paul Schiff
Berman, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws:  Redefining Governmental
Interests in a Global Era, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1819 (2005) (arguing for “cosmopolitan
approach” to choice of law, focusing less on territoriality and more on international
system).
326 See Whytock, supra note 89, pt. III, at 44–50 (arguing for governance-oriented anal-
ysis of transnational law, with “a focus on transnational law in action as a complement to
doctrinal analysis, and a focus on the transnational shadow of the law as a complement to
litigation-oriented analysis”).
327 Id. pt. III.A.1, at 45–46.
328 Id. pt. I.A.1.b, at 12–13.
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Second, as a complement to litigant-oriented analysis,
governance-oriented analysis also examines the “transnational
shadow of domestic law”:  It analyzes the implications of domestic
court decisions not only for particular litigants in particular lawsuits
but also for transnational activity more generally.329  This Article has
emphasized the transnational implications of international choice-of-
law decisions, including the effects on global economic welfare, trans-
national rule of law, and bargaining among transnational actors.
Choice-of-law scholarship is doctrinally and theoretically rich, but
it still lacks a sufficient body of knowledge about how courts actually
make choice-of-law decisions.  Such knowledge is important; without
it, choice-of-law scholars can continue to debate theories and methods
in the abstract, but they cannot meaningfully evaluate and critique the
ways in which choice of law actually functions.  Without a realistic
understanding of the decisions themselves, we cannot begin to under-
stand their consequences.  Courts are not the only actors relevant to
choice of law; but because judges’ choice-of-law decisions affect both
litigants in particular lawsuits and non-litigants in the broader shadow
of the law, these decisions deserve focused scholarly attention.
Of course, neither this study nor any other can “prove” or “dis-
prove” the mess claims.  Statistical analyses increase knowledge by
improving descriptive and causal inferences and by narrowing our
estimates of the uncertainty surrounding these inferences—not by
providing proof.  Even if a study could prove some level of bias or
unpredictability, “messiness” is ultimately in the eye of the beholder.
I have argued that my findings are good news with regard to interna-
tional choice of law’s impact on global governance; others might insist
that such a conclusion would require even stronger doctrinal influ-
ences and a higher level of predictability.  On balance, however, the
conventional wisdom seems to exaggerate what is wrong with choice
of law and implicitly underestimate its positive contributions to global
governance.  At least in the context of international choice-of-law
decisionmaking, judges appear to be doing a better job than scholars
have commonly assumed.
329 Id. pt. III.A.2, at 47–48.
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